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I. Introduction
Negotiable instruments receive similar treatment in many devel-
oped nations. Justice Story noted one hundred and forty years ago that
"[t]he law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared, in
the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield ... to be in great
measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial
world."1 Nevertheless, three major commercial law systems remain in
the western world: the United States Uniform Commercial Code,2 the
English Bills of Exchange Act,3 and the Geneva Conventions on negoti-
able instruments.4 This article compares these systems of negotiable in-
struments law by discussing the formal requirements for negotiable in-
* B.A., Stetson University; J.D., Vanderbilt University. Associate; McCune,
Hiaasen, Crum, Ferris and Gardner, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
1. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
2. This article only discusses such negotiable instruments as checks, drafts which
are governed by article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, promissory notes, and
certificates of deposit. See U.C.C. § 3-104(2). All states have now adopted article 3 of
the U.C.C. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 (2d ed. 1980).
All citations to the U.C.C are to the 1972 official text unless otherwise indicated.
Scholars have written excellent treatises and commentaries analysing United States law
on negotiable instruments. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra; Holland, Corpo-
rate Officers Beware-Your Signature on a Negotiable Instrument May Be Hazardous
to Your Health, 13 IND. L. REV. 893 (1980). A thorough discussion of United States
law is beyond the scope of this article. The writer will identify significant legal provi-
sions, issues, and policies only to the extent necessary for comparison with law of for-
eign jurisdictions.
3. Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, 45 & 46 Vic., ch. 61, reprinted in 3 HALS-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 186 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Bills of Ex-
change Act]. See also Cheques Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 36, reprinted in 3
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 238 [hereinafter cited as Cheques Act].
4. June 7, 1980, 143 L.N.T.S. 259. The Geneva Conventions are the basis for
commercial practices in several civil law jurisdictions in continental Europe. See infra
note 181. French legal practices will be utilized to illustrate the effects of the Geneva
Conventions on the law of a ratifying country.
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struments, the effects of negotiability, the rudiments of agency law,
questions of conflict of laws, and proposals for reform, addressing the
question: How may an agent avoid personal liability on a negotiable
instrument he signs in his principal's behalf?
II. United States
A. Negotiable Instruments
A negotiable instrument 5 is a written6 and signed promise or order
to pay a sum certain in money to order or to bearer on demand or at a
specific time.7 These instruments include drafts, checks, certificates of
deposit, and promissory notes. 8 A negotiable instrument confers legal
rights on a holder9 separate from a party's rights on any underlying
obligation. 10 An obligor may be subject to suit either on or off the in-
strument." No one is liable on a negotiable instrument, however, unless
5. Whether an instrument is negotiable may determine whether a person obli-
gated on the instrument may present personal defenses against a holder. See U.C.C. §
3-305. This note will, therefore, devote substantial attention to definition of negotiable
instruments.
6. U.C.C. § 1-201(46) defines "writing" to include "printing, typewriting, or any
other intentional reduction to tangible form."
7. U.C.C. § 3-104(1).
8. U.C.C. § 3-104(2).
9. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) defines "holder" as "a person who is in possession of a
document of title or an instrument or a certificated investment security drawn, issued,
or indorsed to him or his order or to bearer or in blank." A holder in due course is a
holder who has purchased the negotiable instrument for value (defined in U.C.C. § 3-
303 as a significant economic interest), in good faith, and without notice of any claim
or defense to the instrument or of any violation of its provisions. U.C.C. § 3-302.
There can only be a holder in due course if the instrument is negotiable. See
U.C.C. § 3-805. A holder in due course takes the instrument free from most defenses,
including failure of consideration. U.C.C. § 3-305.
The Code distinguishes between real defenses, which an obligor may assert against
a holder in due course (U.C.C. § 3-305), and personal defenses such as failure of con-
sideration (U.C.C. § 3.408), which an obligor may not assert against a holder in due
course. An agent may also escape liability on the instrument if his principal ratifies the
signature; the agent then may be liable to the principal. U.C.C. § 3-404 official com-
ment 3.
10. U.C.C. § 3-301.
11. U.C.C. § 3-802 qualifies this concept of obligations both on and off the
instrument:
(l)unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation
[Vol. 9
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his signature12 appears on the instrument 13 or is firmly attached on an
allonge.14
The Code defines "signature" broadly. A signature may be "any
symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to au-
thenticate a writing."15 The word "adopted" implies that after a mark
is executed, a party may cause that mark to become his valid signature.
The Official Comment advises courts to use "common sense and com-
mercial experience" to determine whether a given mark constitutes a
signature.1 " Although a letterhead may be a signature for purposes of
the Code, the finder of the fact should be loath to find a "signature"
in such an improbable place.
B. Signature by Agent
Commercial practice requires, and article 3 affirms, that agents
may obligate their principals without binding themselves on negotiable
instruments if the agents are authorized to sign instruments and they
sign according to the rigid forms prescribed by the Code. An agent
may present the same defenses that his principal could assert in an
action to enforce payment on a negotiable instrument. If the agent
deviates from the Code's requirements, he may find himself personally
obligated and unable to assert a defense against a holder in due course.
(a)the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of
the instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against the underlying
obligor; and
(b)in any other case the obligation is suspended pro tanto until the instrument is
due or if it is payable on demand until its presentment. If the instrument is dishon-
ored action may be maintained on either the instrument or the obligation; discharge
of the underlying obligor on the instrument also discharges him on the obligation.
(2)The taking in good faith of a check which is not post dated does not of itself so
extend the time on the original obligation as to discharge of surety.
Id.
12. See U.C.C. § 3-401(2), defining "signature" broadly as "any name, includ-
ing any trade or assume name . . . or by any word or mark used in lieu of a written
signature."
13. U.C.C. § 3-401.
14. U.C.C. § 3-401(1) and official comment 1, referring to U.C.C. § 3-202(2),
which provides that an allonge is deemed to be part of the instrument to which it is
attached.
15. U.C.C. § 1-201(39).
16. U.C.C. § 1-201 official comment 39.
17. Id.
19841
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1. Form of Signature
An agent must satisfy stringent requirements for the form of his
signature in order to obligate his principal and to escape personal lia-
bility on the instrument."' Professor Arthur E. Sutherland summarized
the effect of these provisions on signatures executed in both proper and
improper form:
3-403(2) contemplates at least three diferrent types of signatures:
(1) X. Inc. A. E. Brown
(2) X. Inc. by A. E. Brown, V.P.
(3) A. E. Brown, Vice President
Under 3-403(2), in case (1), as Mr. Brown did not indicate his
representative capacity, both he and X Inc. are bound. In case (2),
only X Inc. is bound because the instrument names the representa-
tive capacity. In the third case, although the unfortunate signer
added words indicating a representative capacity, he failed to dis-
close his principal. Under these circumstances, X Inc. not being
named, is not bound; and Brown is individually bound. 9
The signer of a negotiable instrument generally will be personally
18. U.C.C. § 3-403 provides:
(I)A signature may be made by an agent or other representative, and his authority to
make it may be established as in any other cases of representation. No particular
form of appointment is necessary to establish such authority.
(2)An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument
(a)is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person represented
nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity;
(b)except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally
obligated if the instrument names the person represented but does not show that the
representative signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does not name
the person represented but does show that the representative signed in a representa-
tive capacity.
Id.
The language "or other representative" in U.C.C. § 3-403 was added to show that
trustees and executors or administrators of estates, in addition to technical agents, may
affect legal relations between legal entities. See U.C.C. § 1-201(35).
19. Letter of Professor Arthur E. Sutherland to New York Law Revision Com-
mission, August 9, 1954, reprinted in 1 LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORTS OF
HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 240, 251 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORTS].
[Vol. 9
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liable unless the instrument indicates that he signed in a representative
capacity and the instrument also identifies the principal.20 The intro-
ductory phrase "except as otherwise established between the immediate
parties" indicates that this rule is not conclusive. An agent who appears
obligated on a negotiable instrument may in some cases escape liability
by presenting parol evidence showing the parties did not intend to bind
him. Courts will only admit parol evidence, however, if the instrument
contains an ambiguity placing the holder on notice that the intended
obligor may be someone other than the person who signed. A substan-
tial body of precedent has established that the requisite ambiguity may
exist anywhere on the face of the instrument; the form of the signature
need not place the holder on notice that the signer did not intend to be
bound.
In St. Croix Engineering Corp. v. McLay,21 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court admitted parol evidence as it held that the agent was not
personally obligated on the instrument.2 2 The court considered facts in-
dicating that the plaintiff knew initially that the defendant signed in a
representative capacity: the name, address, and logo of Mitronics, Inc.,
were printed in the upper left corner of each check; a check cutting
machine imprinted the written sum on each check; St. Croix knew Mc-
Lay did business as a corporation; St. Croix initially sued Mitronics,
Inc., rather than McLay; the plaintiff complained to Mitronics after
the checks were dishonored.23 The court found that section 3-403 re-
quired acknowledgement of agency on the instrument, but not necessa-
rily in the signature.2 4 The opinion recognized that the fact finder may
consider business practice and custom. 25 The court also indicated in
dicta that it would be more likely to find an agent personally liable on a
corporate note than on a corporate check. 6
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia admitted parol
20. See U.C.C. § 3-403, supra note 18.
21. 304 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. 1981).
22. Id. at 915. Gerald McLay, president of Mitronics, Inc., issued checks to St.
Croix Engineering Corp. St. Croix sued Mitronics when the checks were dishonored,
and Mitronics entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy. St. Croix then sued the estate of Mc-
Lay, who had died after Mitronics entered bankruptcy. St. Croix claimed that Mc-
Lay's failure to indicate he signed on behalf of Mitronics caused McLay to be person-
ally liable on the instrument under U.C.C. § 3-403. Id. at 913-14.
23. Id. at 914-15.
24. Id. at 914.
25. Id. at 915, citing J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 405.
26. McLay, 304 N.W.2d at 915.
1984]
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evidence to exonerate the defendant in Chidakel v. Blonder.17 Plaintiff
sued Harvey and Florence Blonder on a note that provided:
For Value Received Discount Car Wash Number Five, A Va.
Corp. promise [sic] to pay to the order of Pauline P. Chidakel the
sum of One Hundred Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars.
Attest: Discount Car Wash Number 5
(Initials "H.B.") by (signature
of Florence Blonder). 28
The court found that Harvey was not bound because the face of
the instrument revealed that he signed only as a witness.2 9 The opinion
next recognized that this promissory note did not fall within any cate-
gory in U.C.C. section 3-403; the note was a hybrid of sections 3-
403(2)(b) and 3-403(3). 0 Florence's title did not follow her name, but
her name followed the word "by" and was immediately below the name
of the business. The opinion recognized that the face of the note indi-
cated the person represented (Discount) and provided some evidence
that Florence signed in a representative capacity.31 The court noted a
split of authority over whether the word "by" may be evidence of rep-
resentative rather than personal capacity,3 2 and held that parol evi-
dence was admissible in this case to show the agent signed only in a
representative capacity.
The St. Croix Engineering Corp. and Chidakel courts based their
holdings on findings that the face of the instrument did not show
clearly whether the agent signed in a representative capacity. The
courts admitted parol evidence to resolve the dispute. The Alabama Su-
preme Court elaborated on this view in Wurzburg Bros. Inc. v. Cole-
man.3 The opinion noted that the Code3 4 allows parol evidence to re-
27. 431 A.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
28. Id. at 595.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 596.
31. Id.
32. Compare Southeastern Financial Corp. v. Smith, 397 F. Supp. 649 (D. Ala.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 542 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1976); and Dynamic Homes,
Inc. v. Rogers, 331 So. 2d 326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that "by" and other
factors indicate representative rather than personal capacity) with Giacalone v. Bern-
stein, 348 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 980 (Fla.
1977).
33. 404 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1981). Defendant was president of Coleman American
Moving Services, Inc. Plaintiff sold supplies to Coleman American on an open account.
[Vol. 9
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solve a dispute between initial parties to the instrument if there is a
partially disclosed principal,3 5 or if the instrument names the person
represented, but does not indicate the agent signed in a representative
capacity.36 The Wurzburg Bros. Inc. court next found it could look be-
yond the signature on the instrument to determine representative ca-
pacity,37 but noted that defendant had the burden of proof to establish
he was not liable. 8 The opinion emphasized the policy of promoting
certainty and predictability in the law of negotiable instruments.3 9
Holders of instruments "should be able 'to tell at a glance whose obli-
gation they hold' ".40
In their debates about the Uniform Commercial Code, the New
York Law Revision Commission devoted surprisingly little attention to
the policies behind U.C.C. section 3-403.41 The dearth of discussion
may have resulted from the similarity between the New York Negotia-
ble Instruments Law then in effect and U.C.C. section 3-403.42 The
Coleman American paid with checks that the bank dishonored. Plaintiff's credit man-
ager feared Coleman American would become insolvent. He therefore had defendant
sign a note to secure the debt. The note provided: "Coleman American Moving Ser-
vices, Inc. promises to pay ... $44,419.68." The note was signed "James H. Cole-
man" and did not indicate that Coleman signed in a representative capacity. The Ala-
bama Supreme Court admitted parole evidence and found defendant personally liable
on the instrument. Id. at 335-37.
34. U.C.C. § 3-403(2) provides "except as otherwise established ... " implying
that parol evidence is admissible in the situations described.
35. Wurzburg Bros, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 336. A person acts for a partially dis-
closed principal if he acknowledges the representative capacity of his signature but he
does not identify the persons he represents. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4
(1958), [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
36. Wurzburg Bros, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 336.
37. Id. The court recognized opposing authority. See, e.g. St. Regis Paper Co. v.
Wicklund, 24 Wash. App. 552, 597 P.2d 926 (1979).
38. Wurzburg Bros., Inc., 404 So. 2d at 336 (citing Byrd Co. v. Tolbert, 286
Ala. 465, 241 So. 2d 840 (1971)); Fanning v. Hembree Oil Co., 245 Ark. 825, 434
S.W.2d 822 (1968). Defendant failed to meet this burden; the court placed little
weight on his self serving statements because another court had recently convicted him
of securities fraud. Wurzburg Bros, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 337.
39. Wurzburg Bros, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 336, citing Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v.
Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 23, 385 N.E.2d 1068, 413 N.Y.S. 2d 141 (1978).
40. Wurzburg Bros, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 336, quoting J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 2, at 489.
41. See generally LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 19.
42. Section 38 of the New York Negotiable Instrument Law (1877) was adopted
from section 19 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896). 1 LAW REVISION
COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 19 at 223 (1955). This section provided: "Signature
1984]
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Law Revision Commission noted that both the U.C.C. and the Negoti-
able Instruments Law imposed a potentially severe burden on an agent
who intended to act on behalf of another.43 The Commission concluded,
however, that "[t]he requirements of certainty and definiteness of com-
mercial paper are thought to call for this unfortunate's [the agent's]
sacrifice if he has not signed in the correct form. That is the rationale
of the harsh rule, as described in Comment 3 to Section 3-403."" 4 The
Commissioners observed that New York followed the minority rule
which admitted parol evidence in a suit between initial parties but re-
fused to admit it as a defense to suit by a holder in due course.45 The
Commission concluded that adoption of the U.C.C. would change this
practice. 46 The Code, however, may achieve a similar result in a less
direct manner because an obligor may assert personal defenses, includ-
ing failure of consideration,47 against anyone other than a holder in due
course.
48
In Havatampa Corp. v. Walton Drug Co., Inc.,49 a Florida District
Court of Appeals noted that the presumption in favor of agent's per-
sonal liability promotes certainty and predictability in negotiable in-
by agent; authority; how shown.-The signature of any party may be made by a duly
authorized agent. No particular form of appointment is necessary for this purpose; and
the authority of the agent may be established as in other cases of agency." Id.
43. Id. at 225.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 226-27.
46. Id. at 227.
47. U.C.C. § 3-408.
48. U.C.C. § 3-305. The Commission recognized policies supporting the minority
rule and the U.C.C.:
A holder in due course should not be required to inquire what was meant
by that form of signature [words of agency alone]. Such inquiry would
slow up the ready transfer of negotiable instruments as a substitute for
money. Hence the agent should not be allowed as against a holder in due
course to show by parol evidence that he did not intend to bind himself
personally. But as against a plaintiff who is the payee and who has dealt
directly with the agent, it does not seem to make sense to say that the
agent will not be permitted to show that such payee plaintiff knew that the
agent did not intend to be bound personally, for the payee could not have
been misled by such form of signature.
2 LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 19, at 227 (quoting F. WHITNEY,
BILLS AND NOTES 19 (1943).
49. 354 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Defendants executed a note
stating "We promise to pay .... ," and signed
[Vol. 9
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struments. 50 Imposing a burden on the agent to reveal his representa-
tive capacity and to identify his principal makes negotiable instruments
easier to understand by their purchasers and thereby enhances negotia-
bility.51 The court refused to dismiss suit against the agent because
there was an ambiguity on the face of the promissory note the agent
signed.
2. Authority for Signature
An agent generally will be liable on a negotiable instrument if he
signs in his principal's behalf but without the principal's authority.52
The Official Comment elaborates: " 'Unauthorized signature' . . .in-
cludes both a forgery and a signature made by an agent exceeding his
actual or apparent authority. ' 53 In hearings in which it decided to
adopt the U.C.C. for the District of Columbia, the District of Colum-
bia Committee in the House of Representatives noted that the Code
was not an abrupt change from existing law; it merely settled several
questions as it codified current commercial law concepts.54 Principles of
law and equity, including the law of principal and agent, supplement
Walton Drug Co., Inc. d/b/a Touchton
Drugs and/or
(seal) (seal)
Bob Edrington, Owner
Bob Edrington, President.
(seal)
The court refused to dismiss the suit because reasonable people could differ over
whether the parties intended the agent to be bound. The opinion noted that the word
"President" after Edrington's signature may have been used either to identify the
signer or to show representative capacity. Id. at 1236-37.
50. Id. at 1237.
51. Id.
52. See U.C.C. § 3-404(1), which provides:
Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person
whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it;
but it operates as the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of any
person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for value.
An exhaustive study of agency law is beyond the scope of this note. The author
presents the following discussion as an overview to applicable law and practice.
53. U.C.C. § 3-404 official comment 1.
54. Hearing on H.R. 5338 Before Subcommittee Five of the Committee on the
District of Columbia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), HousE MISCELLANEOUS RE-
PORTS ON PUBLIC BILLS, serial set 12, 540 at 3.
1984]
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the Code except when these principles are clearly inconsistent with the
Code's provisions.5" This is fortunate; article 3 does not delineate the
possible sources of an agent's authority to bind his principal. The offi-
cial Comment to section 3-403 provides some insight but does not clar-
ify adequately the possible sources of authority.56 The Code directs the
practitioner to other legal sources, particularly the common law, for
interpretation of agent's authority.57
The second Restatement of Agency recognizes five sources of an
agent's power to bind his principal: express authority,58 implied author-
ity,59 apparent authority,60 inherent power, 61 and ratification. 62
a. Express Authority
Express authority is easy to recognize and, if written, is easy to
prove. 63 The essential requirement is a communication by the principal
to the agent indicating that the agent may act on the principal's be-
half.64 Courts will only consider the statement by the principal; the
principal's unexpressed intent is irrelevant.6 5 An agent who relies on an
express conferral of authority by the principal and who signs according
to the form provided in U.C.C. section 3-403 will bind the principal but
will not obligate himself on the instrument.66
b. Implied Authority
The Restatement of Agency defines implied authority as actual
55. U.C.C. § 1-103.
56.
The power to sign for another may be an express authority, or it may be
implied in law or in fact, or it may rest merely upon apparent authority. It
may be established as in other cases of representation, and when relevant
parol evidence is admissible to prove it or deny it.
U.C.C. § 3-403 official comment.
57. See U.C.C. § 1-403.
58. RESTATEMENT § 7.
59. Id. at § 35.
60. Id. at §§ 8, 159.
61. Id. at § 8A.
62. Id. at § 82; U.C.C. § 3-404 official comment 3.
63. See generally RESTATEMENT § 7 at 28-29, § 26 at 100.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 26 at 100.
66. Id. §§ 320, 324.
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authority to perform acts that are incidental to the purpose of the
agency. 67 Communications between principal and agent determine ap-
plicability of both express and implied authority.68 An agent should be
loath to rely on implied authority in the absence of such factors as
business emergencies69 or a principal's statements to third parties by
which the principal recognizes the agent's authority to act.70 The Re-
statement clarifies the scope of implied authority. Unless otherwise
agreed, authority to manage a business includes authority to make inci-
dental or reasonably necessary contracts, to buy necessary equipment
and supplies, to make necessary repairs, to employ or discharge em-
ployees as reasonably necessary, to sell products in accordance with
business purposes, to receive payment on the principal's behalf, and to
pay business debts.7
c. Apparent Authority
A principal's statement to a third party that his agent has author-
ity to act will confer apparent authority on the agent and will empower
the agent to bind the principal, even if the principal privately ordered
the agent not to act. 2 Courts limit the scope of apparent authority by
requiring the third party's reliance to be reasonable.7 3 In Taillie v.
67. "Unless otherwise agreed, authority to conduct a transaction includes author-
ity to do acts which are incidental to it, usually accompany it, or are reasonably neces-
sary to accomplish it." Id. § 35.
68. Ebasco Services, Inc. v. Pa. Power & L. Co., 402 F. Supp. 421, 445 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
69. RESTATEMENT § 47 recognizes the agent's authority to do whatever he rea-
sonably believes necessary to prevent a substantial loss to his principal in an unforeseen
situation. The unforseen situation and reasonable belief as to what is necessary may be
difficult to establish. Courts, therefore, have considered relatively few cases in which
agents relied on implied or emergency authority.
70. See "apparent authority," infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
71. RESTATEMENT § 73.
72. Id. § 8 and comment a; § 160.
73. In Stephens v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 627 P.2d 439 (Okla. 1981), the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the appear-
ance of an agency relation. Id. at 442. The Stephens plaintiff had the defendant repair
a motorcycle tire because plaintiff believed defendant was affiliated with Conoco. The
only reason for believing there was a connection between defendant's service station
and Conoco was the small Conoco sign defendant displayed. When his tire deflated,
plaintiff sued defendant's service station and Conoco, Inc., arguing that defendant had
apparent authority to bind Conoco to express and implied warranties. Id. at 440. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Conoco as it noted, "Ap-
1984]
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Chedester7' the Tennessee Court of Appeals based a finding of appar-
ent authority on a course of dealing. The unanimous opinion found that
plaintiffs were entitled to rely on apparent authority of Chedester's
fiancee' because of her supervision of construction and the course of
changes she ordered. 5
Similarly, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found apparent au-
thority in a course of dealing in Southline Equipment Co. v. National
Marine Service, Inc., 6 but noted that estoppel is the basis for apparent
parent authority exists only to the extent that it is reasonable for the third person
dealing with the agent to believe that the agent is authorized. Id. at 441 (quoting
RESTATEMENT § 8 comment c. The court quoted Rosser-Moon Furniture Co. v.
Oklahoma State Bank, 192 Okla. 169, 135 P.2d 336 (1943)):
"Apparent authority" of an agent is such authority as the principal know-
ingly permits the agent to assume or which he holds the agent out as pos-
sessing. And the elements that must be present before a third person can
hold the principal for the acts of the agent on the theory of apparent au-
thority are (a) conduct of the principal, (b) reliance thereon by the third
person, and (c) change of position by the third person to his detriment.
Stephens, 627 P.2d at 441.
74. 600 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. App. 1980). Chedester entered an agreement with a
general contractor to build his home. Chedester's fiancee watched the work and pro-
posed changes in plans. The contractor considered her Chedester's agent, and made all
changes she proposed. When she asked to change cabinets, the contractor introduced
her to plaintiffs, who were cabinet makers. She agreed to proposed plans and cost.
When Chedester did not pay for the change, plaintiffs sued Chedester and the general
contractor. The court rejected Chedester's argument that he had never authorized his
fiancee to act on his behalf. Id. at 733-35.
75. Id. at 735. The court quoted 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 73 (1962):
[S]o far as concerns a third person dealing with an agent, the agency's
"scope of authority" includes not only the actual authorization conferred
upon the agent by the principal, but also that which has apparently been
delegated to him. Apparent authority, or ostensible authority, as it is also
called, is that which, though not actually granted, the principal knowingly
permits the agent to exercise, or which he holds him out as possessing. In
effect, therefore, an agent's apparent authority is, as to third persons deal-
ing in good faith with the subject of his agency and entitled to rely upon
such appearance, his real authority, and it may apply to a single transac-
tion, or to a series of transactions.
600 S.W.2d at 734-35.
76. 598 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). National sued Southline for amounts
due for repair of Southline's forklift. Southline claimed its employees, Whitey and
Plaunty, did not have authority to enter in a contract for Southline. Plaunty previously
placed orders; Plaunty and Whitey were present while plaintiff worked on the forklift,
with their employer's implicit approval. Id. at 341-42.
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authority. Apparent authority7 exists if the principal causes a reasona-
bly prudent person to believe the agent has authority to act."8 The
court agreed with defendant that only manifestations by the principal
are relevant; an agent may not create apparent authority by his own
words or conduct.79 In this case, however, the court found sufficient
evidence of manifestations by the principal to invoke apparent
authority.8 0
d. Inherent Agency Power
Drafters of the Restatement attempted to find a theoretical justifi-
cation for judicial decisions imposing liability on the principal for acts
of the agent when the principal had conferred neither actual nor appar-
ent authority.81 Section 8A of the Restatement adopts the term inher-
ent agency power which refers to "the power of an agent which is de-
rived not from authority, apparent authority or estoppel, but solely
from the agency relation and exists for the protection of persons
harmed by or dealing with a servant or other agent." 2
Neither the U.C.C. nor the official comments mentions inherent
power as a basis for freeing an unauthorized agent from liability under
section 3-404. It also appears that no appellate tribunal has directly
addressed the issue. The Code indicates, however, that courts should
follow a traditional analysis of the law of principal and agent as they
evaluate the scope of an agent's authority. 3 In Musulin v. Woodtek,
Inc., 4 the Oregon Supreme Court suggested that inherent power, de-
77. Id. at 343.
78. Id. at 343, citing Chastain v. Cooper & Reed, 152 Tex. 322, 257 S.W.3d 433
(1953).
79. Id. at 343 (citing Bugh v. Word, 424 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968)).
80. Id. at 343.
81. See, e.g., Butler v. Maples, 76 U.S. 766 (1869).
82. RESTATEMENT § 8A.
83. U.C.C. § 3-403(1) recognizes that the agent's authority may be established
as in other cases of representation.
84. 491 P.2d 1173 (Or. 1971). Charles Benert, Woodtek's general manager and
vice president, signed an $80,000 promissory note on behalf of Woodtek. Id. at 1174.
Woodtek defended subsequent suit on the grounds of lack of consideration and lack of
actual or apparent authority for Benert to obligate the corporation. The court cited a
pre-U.C.C. case, DuBois Matlack Lumber Co. v. Davis Lumber Co., 149 Or. 571, 573,
42 P.2d 152, 154 (1935), for the proposition that neither the president nor the vice
president has inherent power to obligate a corporation on a negotiable instrument. See
also Capital Bank v. American Eyewear, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980),
1984]
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fined in the case as "power flowing from the nature of the office," 85
may be relevant only if no other source of authority is available. A
mere vice president or president may not have inherent power to bind a
corporation. If the corporate officer signs an instrument without actual
or apparent authority he will bind himself and the court will require a
high threshold of proof to establish inherent power.
Courts are most likely to invoke inherent power to obligate the
principal of a general agent.8" A general agent may have power to bind
his principal in transactions that usually accompany, or that are inci-
dental to, work he is authorized to perform if the third party reasona-
bly believes the agent is authorized to act.87
e. Ratification
The U.C.C. provides that a principal may ratify the unauthorized
signature of his agent if the agent purported to sign in his behalf.88 The
Official Comment recognizes that ratification is retroactive, and that it
may relieve an unauthorized agent from personal liability on the instru-
ment.89 An unauthorized signer, however, may be liable to the principal
even after ratification.90 A court may find ratification in express state-
ments by the principal or in the principal's retention of benefits after he
learns of the unauthorized signature.91 The Restatement would place a
heavy burden on a principal. Section 43 finds ratification in a princi-
pal's acquiescence in an unauthorized act.9 Section 94 suggests that
failure to take active measures to repudiate an unauthorized act may
in which the court held that a bank president did not have actual or apparent authority
or inherent power to sign a lease on the bank's behalf. The Musulin court did not
address the issue of agent's liability as it affirmed judgment for plaintiff.
85. Musulin, 491 P.2d at 1177.
86. A general agent is "an agent authorized to conduct a series of transactions
involving a continuity of service." RESTATEMENT § 3(1); Ebasco Services, Inc. v. Penn.
Power & Light Co., 402 F. Supp. 421, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
87. RESTATEMENT § 161; Ebasco Services, Inc. v. Penn. Power & Light Co., 402
F. Supp. 421, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
88. U.C.C. § 3-404(2).
89.U.C.C. § 3-404(2) official comment 3: "[T]he word 'ratified' is used in order to
make it clear that the adoption is retroactive... [tlhe ratification relieves the actual
signer from liability on the signature."
90. U.C.C. § 3-404(2) and official comment 3.
91. U.C.C. § 3-404 official comment 3.
92. RESTATEMENT § 43.
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imply affirmance.9 3 The extent of this burden remains unclear.
f. Termination of Authority
An agent acting within the apparent scope of authority may find
himself personally obligated under U.C.C. section 3-404(1) if the
agency relation terminates before he signs an instrument on behalf of
his principal. This result protects innocent principals and third parties
and it places a substantial burden on the agent to verify his status
before each representative act. The Restatement enumerates estab-
lished grounds for termination of the agency relation.94 Actual author-
ity ends at the time specified in the agent's contract with the princi-
pal. 95 If the original agreement does not provide for duration of
authority, the relation will cease when the agent accomplishes the au-
thorized act96 or when specified events occur.97 In most cases a princi-
pal may unilaterally terminate an agent's employment or an agent may
expressly or implicitly renounce the relation 8 However, a party who
wrongfully terminates the relation may be liable in damages for breach
of contract or for other grounds. Actual authority will also end if either
principal or agent loses capacity to contract.99 This most often occurs
upon death of the principal or of the agent or upon the winding up of a
corporate principal or agent.
The Supreme Court of Arizona followed the majority rule in Mubi
v. Broomfield'00 as it held that death of the principal instantaneously
93. RESTATEMENT § 94 official comment a (limiting the broad ramifications of
this rule). The drafters would leave broad discretion to the factfinder by basing the test
for ratification on whether the principal failed to object when "according to the ordi-
nary experience and habits of men, one would naturally be expected to speak if he did
not consent." Id.
94. See RESTATEMENT §§ 105-39.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
96. RESTATEMENT § 106.
97. Id. § 107.
98. Id. § 118.
99. Id. § 122.
100. 108 Ariz. 39, 492 P.2d 700 (1972). Petitioner's decedent sued Walter and
Jane Doe Tribble for injuries he suffered in a car accident. On August 5, 1970,
defendants filed an offer of judgment. Rule 68 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure
required any offer to be accepted in writing within ten days or it would be deemed
withdrawn. Before he died on August 11, 1970, petitioner's decedent told his wife to
accept the offer. She immediately instructed their attorney to accept the proposal but
he did not file the required acceptance until after decedent's death. Id. at 40-41, 492
19841
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ends agency authority by operation of law. 101 The court considered
whether the attorney had authority after his client's death to carry out
instructions made before death. In holding that the acceptance was not
valid, the unanimous opinion noted, "[w]here there is only a naked au-
thority, not coupled with an interest, the death of the principal without
notice ends the agent's authority to act in his principal's behalf." 02
This decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it does not require
any notice to the agent before his authority is terminated. Second, it
does not apply to a power coupled with an interest.0 3 The court ob-
served, however, that courts sometimes make an exception to protect
innocent third parties who deal with an agent in good faith and without
knowledge of the principal's death. 04
The Supreme Court of Washington considered requirements for
termination of apparent authority in Lazov v. Black. 0 5 The court noted
the general rule protecting third parties from revocation of an agent's
authority without notice, by stating that "generally, termination by a
principal of an agency relationship is not effective as to the agent and
third parties who have previously dealt with the agent in that capacity
until notice of the termination of the relationship is conveyed to
them."'0 6 The court found the general rule inapplicable in this case
because statutes required filing of a revocation of power of attorney
and provided that filing was constructive notice to third parties. 0 7
Mubi and Lazov indicate that an agent's authority may terminate
immediately upon the death or incapacity of the principal-even with-
out notice to the agent or third party. An agent or third party, how-
ever, may continue to rely on an agent's appearance of authority after
P.2d at 701-702.
101. Id. at 41, 492 P.2d at 702.
102. Id.
103. See infra text accompanying notes I 10-114.
104. Mubi, 108 Ariz. at 42 n. 1, 492 P.2d at 703 n. 1.
105. 88 Wash. 2d 883, 567 P.2d 233 (1977). Spridon Lazov executed and re-
corded a general power of attorney naming his wife attorney in fact. He left the state
and his wife purchased a home in their names from appellants. Mrs. Lazov then con-
veyed her husband's interest to Mr. and Mrs. Boyce. Mr. Lazov returned to the state,
filed suit for divorce, and told his wife he intended to revoke the power of attorney. He
accepted a quitclaim deed from Mr. and Mrs. Boyce and filed a revocation of the
power of attorney. The wife then conveyed their interest in the property to appellants.
The husband sued and the trial court declared the deed void. Id. at 884-85, 567 P.2d at
234.
106. Id. at 886, 567 P.2d at 234.
107. Id. at 885-6, 567 P.2d at 234-5.
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they have dealt together and until they receive notice that the principal
has revoked the agent's authority. The Mubi court reconciled this ap-
parent inconsistency; the agent's authority is derivative-if the princi-
pal does not have capacity to contract the agent can have no power to
contract on his behalf.108 However, an agent claiming that his apparent
authority remains does not assert a greater capacity than his principal
enjoys; he merely asserts that he retains a power he once possessed.
The Mubi opinion suggests, furthermore, that an agent whose power is
coupled with an interest in the transaction may retain authority even
after the principal's death or attempted revocation. 109
The Arizona Supreme Court clarified the doctrine of power cou-
pled with an interest in Phoenix Title and Trust Co. v. Grimes.110 The
trial court entered summary judgment for defendants and the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that agency power to sell the land passed to the
agent's estate because the agent had a power coupled with an economic
interest in the underlying transactions."' The court limited this rule by
noting that personal service contracts may not be assignable if they can
only be performed by the initial person employed." 2 The unanimous
opinion found that the agent's power in this case:
was a power coupled with an interest, and is irrevocable. It is of
course the general rule that the death of either principal or agent
terminates the relationship. However, the exception to the rule is
that if the agency or power of the agent is coupled with an interest
in the subject matter of the agency, the power so coupled will sur-
vive to the personal representative of the agent upon the death of
the agent." 3
The court found that the decedent's rights survived his death"14 be-
108. Mubi, 108 Ariz. at 41-42, 492 P.2d at 702-3.
109. See supra text accompanying note 102.
110. 101 Ariz. 182, 416 P.2d at 979 (1966). Plaintiff's decedent was a coven-
turer in a land development plan. He owned an undivided 7/24 interest in the property,
and the other investors signed a contract giving him the exclusive right to subdivide,
advertise, develop, and sell the land for a commission; the agreement explicitly pro-
vided that this right would pass to decedent's heirs or assigns. Defendants refused to
permit the executor to continue performing the contract. Id.
111. Id. at 184-85, 416 P.2d at 981-82.
112. Id. at 185, 416 P.2d at 982.
113. Id. at 184-85, 416 P.2d at 981-82 (citing Commercial Nursery Co. v. Ivey,
164 Tenn. 502, 51 S.W.2d 238 (1932)).
114. See also Matter of Estate of Gray, 541 P.2d 336 (Colo. App. 1975), in
1984]
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cause the decedent was a conventurer with an economic interest in ad-
dition to his interest in the exercise of the power to manage the
property.
C. Summation
An attorney advising an agent should recommend that the agent
have a written statement establishing the scope of authority because
the agent's subsequent attempt to prove implied authority or inherent
power may be especially difficult. If an agent acts pursuant to written
authorization, particularly a power of attorney, he should follow its
terms strictly. The agent should show on the instrument both his repre-
sentative capacity and the identity of his principal. An attorney deter-
mining who is liable on a negotiable instrument must consider several
questions. Did the agent name the principal? Did the agent properly
acknowledge his representative capacity? Did the agent have authority
to bind the principal? If the agent did not have authority to bind the
principal, then did the principal ratify his agent's conduct?
These questions are essential to determination of liability not only
on negotiable instruments in the United States, but also on countries
that adopted the English Bills of Exchange Act"' and the Geneva Con-
ventions on negotiable instruments. 116
III. England
A. Negotiable Instruments
The English law of negotiable instruments is based on the Bills of
Exchange Act and the Cheques Act.1 17 The Bills of Exchange Act was
the basis for the United States Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
which the Colorado Court of Appeals found decedent had a sufficient interest in oil
wells for his power as agent to pass to his estate.
115. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
117. Section 1 of the Cheques Act protects bankers who pay cheques in good
faith, without negligence, and in the ordinary course of business; Sections 2 and 4
protect bankers who participate in the cheque collection process. Section 5 of the Che-
ques Act adopts Bills of Exchange provisions for crossed cheques. Further discussion of
the Cheques Act is beyond the scope of this note.
[Vol. 9
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and influenced the evolution of the Uniform Commercial Code."18 Ne-
gotiable instruments may be transferred as readily under the Bills of
Exchange Act as under the Uniform Commercial Code. If a holder
takes a negotiable bill of exchange in good faith, for value, and without
notice of any defect in title, he becomes a holder in due course" 9 and
will hold the bill free from any personal defenses or defect of title. 120
The United States practitioner should feel reasonably comfortable
when planning commercial transactions in any of the countries that
adopted the English Bills of Exchange Act. The Bills of Exchange Act
generally has the same effect as the Uniform Commercial Code. The
following discussion addresses provisions under the Bills of Exchange
Act that differ from commercial law in the United States.
The statute defines a negotiable bill of exchange:
A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, addressed
by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring
the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed
or determinable future time a sum certain in money to or to the
order of a specified person, or to bearer.121
A drawer may write a bill of exchange on anything that is/not metal. 122
A bill of exchange must be payable to order or to bearer.123 The Act
construes a bill payable to a particular person as payable to that per-
son's order unless the face of the instrument prohibits transfer.124 No
one is liable on a bill of exchange unless his signature appears; 25 but a
118. M. MEGRAH & F. RYDER, BYLES ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 3 (23d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as BYLES ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE].
119. Bills of Exchange Act § 29.
120. Id. § 38(2).
121. Id. § 3(1).
122. BYLES ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 118, at 8. The Coinage Act,
1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 10, reprinted in 6 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 836
(3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Coinage Act], forbids issuance of any metal as "a
token for money, or as purporting that the holder thereof is entitled to demand any
value denoted thereon." Coinage Act. § 5.
123. Id. § 8(2).
124. Id. § 8(4). Compare United States practice requiring use of words "order"
or "bearer." U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(d) and official comment 5 require the use of prescribed
language or a clear equivalent, and provide that in doubtful cases courts should hold
against negotiability. A statement "pay John Doe" would, therefore, be negotiable in
England but not in the United States.
125. Bills of Exchange Act § 23. Compare United States under U.C.C. § 3-
401(2), providing that a person may sign a trade or assumed name.
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person may be personally liable if he signs a trade or assumed name."'
The signature of a partnership's name acts as the personal signature of
every partner. 127 The drawer of indorser may add a statement such as
"without recourse to me" or "sans recours" to eliminate or limit his
liability on the instrument. 2 '
A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank.'29 The Bills of
Exchange Act permits the drawer to "cross" the check and thereby
eliminate negotiability.' Section 83(1) defines "promissory note" as
"an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another
signed by the maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or de-
terminable future time, a sum certain in money, to, or to the order of, a
specified person or to bearer." The maker of a note contracts to pay it
according to its tenor' and is subject to the same liability as in United
Sates practice.132
The Court of Appeals clarified requirements for checks and bills of
exchange and illustrated a difference from United States law13 3 in Or-
bit Mining & Trading Co., Ltd. v. Westminster Bank, Ltd. 34 In hold-
126. Bills of Exchange Act § 23(1).
127. Id. § 23(2).
128. Id. § 16(1). Compare United States practice permitting a drawer or in-
dorser to sign "without recourse" to eliminate personal liability. U.C.C. §§ 3-413, 3-
414. Under the U.C.C. a transfer without recourse does not eliminate all warranty
liability; the transferor then only warrants he has no knowledge of a valid defense
against him. U.C.C. § 3-417(3).
129. Bills of Exchange Act § 73. Lord Chorley defines "cheque" as follows:
A cheque is an unconditional order in writing drawn by one person upon
another, who must be a banker, signed by the drawer, requiring the banker
to pay on demand, or at sight, or on presentation or expressing no time for
payment, a sum certain in money to or to the order of a specified person or
to bearer.
R. CHORLEY, LAW OF BANKING 44 (6th ed. 1974).
130. A check bearing two parallel transverse lines across its face is "crossed,"
and is not negotiable. Bills of Exchange Act §§ 76-81.
131. Id. § 88.
132. U.C.C. §§ 3-413(1), 3-413(3).
133. U.C.C. § 3-111 provides that an instrument will be deemed payable to
bearer if it indicates it is payable to "(a) bearer or the order of bearer; or (b) a speci-
fied persons or bearer; or (c) 'cash', or any other indication which does not purport to
designate a specific payee." Id. The Bills of Exchange Act does not have a comparable
provision. The present court considered whether checks payable to cash could be
negotiable.
134. [1962] 3 All E.R. 565 (C.A.). Epstein was a secretary and a director of
Orbit Mining Company and was authorized to cosign checks with the other director,
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ing for the bank, the court found that the instruments were not
checks135 and that section 4(1)(a) of the Cheques Act protected the
bank from liability since the bank was not negligent in paying. 136 The
court noted that the Cheques Act is to be interpreted in conjunction
with the Bills of Exchange Act.3 7 The Bills of Exchange Act defines a
check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on de-
mand. 13 8 A bill of exchange must be payable to a particular person, to
order, or to bearer. 3 9 Because the instruments were payable to cash
rather than to order, bearer, or a particular person, they were not bills
of exchange and could not be cheques.' 40 The court noted that section
7(3) of the Bills of Exchange Act provides that "[w]here the payee is a
fictitious or non-existing person the bill may be treated as payable to
bearer."'-' The opinion construed this provision strictly, finding that
"cash" was not a person so the Bills of Exchange Act was inapplica-
ble."" Although the instrument was not a check under section 4(2)(a),
it was a document under section 4(2)(b). 4 3 The court found that the
bank was not negligent in paying because there was nothing on the face
of the instrument to place the bank on notice of a defect. 44
B. Signature by Agent
Over one hundred and fifty years ago Chancellor Erskine wrote,
"[n]o rule of law is better ascertained, or stands upon a stronger foun-
dation, than this; that, where an agent names his principal, the princi-
Wolff. Before Wolff left town he signed blank checks so Epstein could continue busi-
ness in his absence. Epstein signed his name, made the instrument payable to cash, and
deposited it in his own account. Orbit Mining sued the drawee bank when it discovered
the fraud. Id.
135. Id. at 570.
136. Id. at 574.
137. Cheques Act § 6.
138. Bills of Exchange Act § 73.
139. Id. § 3(1).
140. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-111, providing that an instrument payable to cash will be
deemed payable to bearer.
141. [1962] 3 All E.R. at 570.
142. Id.
143. Cheques Act § 4(2)(b) provides: "This section applies to the following in-
struments ... (b) any document issued by a customer of a bank which, though not a
bill of exchange, is intended to enable a person to obtain payment from that banker of
the sum mentioned in the document."
144. [1962] 3 All E.R. at 570.
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pal is responsible: not the agent: but, for the application of that rule,
the agent must name his principal as the person to be responsible."' 45
Contemporary practice still follows this principle.
1. Form of Signature
The Bills of Exchange Act states how an agent must sign a negoti-
.able instrument to escape personal liability:
(1) Where a person signs a bill as drawer, indorser, or acceptor,
and adds words to his signature, indicating that he signs for or on
behalf of a principal, or in a representative character, he is not
personally liable thereon; but the mere addition to his signature of
words describing him as an agent, or as filling a representative
characer, does not exempt him from personal liability.
(2) In determining whether a signature on a bill is that of the prin-
cipal or that of the agent by whose hand it is written, the contruc-
tion most favorable to the validity of the instrument shall be
adopted.146
Parliament redrafted this section in committee, and may have liberal-
ized the strict common law presumption that the agent always was per-
sonally liable. 4 7 Courts even today find such terms as "agent" or
"manager" following a signature as mere designatio personae.'48
The form of signature is especially important in England.149 A per-
son who indicates on the instrument that he signs on behalf of another
and who identifies the claimed principal with reasonable certainty gen-
erally will not be liable on the instrument, even if he signs without
145. Ex parte Hartop, 33 Eng. Rep. 132, 133 (1806).
146. Bills of Exchange Act § 26.
147. J. BATT, CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 80 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE]. Lord Ellenborough followed the strict approach
in Leadbitter v. Farrow, 105 Eng. Rep. 1077, 1079 (K.B. 1816):
It is not a universal rule that a man who puts his name to a bill of ex-
change thereby makes himself personally liable, unless he states upon the
face of the bill that he subscribes it for another, or by procuration for
another, which are words of exclusion? Unless he says plainly "I am the
scribe" he is liable.
Id.
148. CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 147, at 80.
149. Compare U.C.C. § 3-404(1), which provides that a person who signs in the
proper form but without authority is personally liable for the instrument.
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authority. 15 0 In deciding whether a signature binds the signer or his
principal, a court will adopt the interpretation most favorable to the
instrument's validity. 115 The Court of Appeals in Ernest Scragg &
Sons, Ltd. v. Perseverance Banking & Trust Co., Ltd.152 demonstrated
the results of failing to disclose the principal on the face of the instru-
ment. The Defendant claimed the plaintiff had actual knowledge that
the plaintiff was acting on behalf of Isranyl, but the court refused to
look beyond the face of the instrument as it found defendant liable for
conversion. The court noted, "English law will attribute to a document
its face value if the document is, or is in the nature of, a negotiable
instrument. . .or if it is what is sometimes called a quasi-negotiable
instrument (as, for example, a bill of lading). . .."153.
Maxform S.P.A. v. Mariani & Goodville Ltd.15 demonstrated the
interrelationship between the Bills of Exchange Act and the Companies
Act of 1948155 and their effect on personal liability of an agent who
fails to disclose his principal. Mariani appealed from the decision of the
trial court, arguing that he could not be liable as an acceptor under
section 17(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act because he was not the
drawee, that the only possible source of liability was section 108(4)(b)
of the Companies Act, which imposes personal liability on agents of
corporations who sign negotiable instruments on behalf of undisclosed
principals, 5 6 and that because the bill of exchange never mentioned
150. Bills of Exchange Act § 26(1).
151. Id. § 26(2).
152. [1973] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 101 (C.A.). Defendant ordered texturing machines
from plaintiffs. The order said it was from Preserverance Banking & Trust Co., Ltd.,
and was signed "for and on behalf of the Preserverance Banking & Trust Co." Pursu-
ant to agreement, plaintiff shipped the goods to Isranyl Ltd. in Israel. Plaintiff sent a
sight draft with invoice and bill of lading to defendant in London. Defendant did not
pay or accept the draft, but immediately forwarded the documents to Isranyl Ltd.
Plaintiff sued for breach of contract and for conversion of documents. Id. at 102.
153. Id. at 103 (citing Building & Civil Engineering Holidays Scheme Manage-
ment Ltd. v. Post Office, [1964] 2 Q.B. 430, 445).
154. [1981] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 54 (C.A.). Italian plaintiff manufac- -tured and sold
furniture to Goodville, Ltd., d/b/a/ Italdesign. Plaintiff drew four bills of exchange for
the purchase price of 4,969,080 lire; three bills totaling 4,073,680 lire were outstanding
at the time of suit. Of all three bills of exchange the drawee was "Italdesign," the
registered trading name for Goodwin, Ltd. The drawer had typed "per accettazione"
below the drawee's name. Mariani signed at the bottom of the bill without any descrip-
tion of his status. Id. at 56.
155. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 ch. 38, reprinted in 5 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 110 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Companies Act].
156. See id.
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Goodville Ltd. or Italdesign, Mariani could not have purported to sign
on their behalf. The Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for plaintiff
as it found that the face of the instrument revealed Mariani signed on
behalf of the drawee without disclosing his representative status.157 The
court agreed that Mariani could not be liable as acceptor, but rejected
his argument that section 26(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act required
the court to look only to the form of signature. 158 The court applied
section 26(2), which required the court to give the instrument the con-
struction most favorable to its validity, and which allowed the court to
look at the instrument as a whole. 159
In addition to disclosing the principal, the agent should avoid am-
biguities on the instrument. In Rolfe Lubbell v. Keith, 160 the Court
accepted plaintiff's agrument that the Bills of Exchange Act section
26(2) requires construction most favorable to the validity of the instru-
ment, 6' that because the principal, Grafton, was already required to
pay, defendants' signatures purportedly binding the company would be
meaningless "mercantile nonsense,' 162 and that the court should allow
parol evidence to determine the parties' intent because of the ambiguity
on the instrument. 163 The court held that the patent ambiguity permit-
ted admission of parol evidence of a course of dealing, and previous
requirement by the plaintiff of personal indorsements indicated a mu-
tual intent that the defendant be personally bound.6 The court noted
that the defendants did not argue that the plaintiff waived his right to
hold them personally liable by his failure to object to the stamp re-
157. Id. at 57.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. [1979] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 75 (Q.B.). Plaintiff supplied cloth to the manufactur-
ing firm Grafton Manquest Ltd. Grafton was delinquent in paying bills of over £9000.
Plaintiff drew three bills of exchange payable by Grafton to Rolfe Lubbell, and
presented them to Grafton for acceptance. After Grafton accepted the bills, Grafton's
managing director, Keith, and company secretary, Greenwood, indorsed the bill in ap-
propriate boxes labeled "managing director" and "company secretary," and immedi-
ately after their signatures stamped "for and on behalf of Grafton Manquest, Lim-
ited." Id. at 76-77.
161. Id. at 77.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 78. Cf. Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bauman Ins. Agency, Inc.,
401 N.E.2d 614 (I11. App. 1980) (admitting parol evidence to show defendant intended
to bind himself on a contract that he signed in an ambiguous capacity).
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vealing the representative capacity of the signature.16
Ernest Scragg, Maxform, and Rolfe Lubbell demonstrate the im-
portance of an unambiguous signature revealing a representative capac-
ity and identifying the principal. A court may refuse to look beyond the
face of an instrument to determine whether the parties intended the
signer to be personally liable. An agent signing on behalf of a principal
should not permit his signature to appear in more than one place on the
instrument because a court may construe the second signature as a per-
sonal indorsement.
2. Authority for Signature
The Bills of Exchange Act provides that an unauthorized signature
generally will be completely inoperative and will not confer any rights
on the instrument. 6 An agent who signs in the proper form, therefore,
will not be personally obligated on the instrument even if he signs with-
out authority. English courts achieve results similar to personal liability
on the instrument by invoking a theory of breach of warranty of
authority.16 7
English law provides an exception by which agents who sign nego-
tiable instruments on behalf of principals may be liable even if they
indicate their representative capacity and identify their principal. A
promoter of a corporation who signs on the corporation's behalf before
the corporation is formed may be personally liable on the instrument
under the European Communities Act of 1972.168
165. Rolfe Lubbell, 2 Lloyds L.R. at 78.
166. Bills of Exchange Act § 24. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-404(1), providing that an agent
who signs without authority of the person he purports to obligate will bind himself.
167. See generally F. REYNOLDS & B. DAVENPORT, BOWSTEAD ON AGENCY
378-86 (14th ed. 1976) and cases cited therein. Analysis of warranty liability arising
off the instrument is beyond the scope of this article.
168. European Communities Act, 1973 ch. 68, reprinted in 42 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 59 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as E.E.C. Act of 1972].
Section 9(2) provies:
Where a contract purports to be made by a company, or by a person as
agent for a company, at a time when the company has not been formed,
then subject to any agreement to the contrary the company shall have the
effect as a contract entered into by the person purporting to act for the
company or as agent for it, and he shall be personally liable on the con-
tract accordingly.
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In Phonogram Ltd. v. Lane,169 the Court of Appeals applied this
statute for the first time170 to hold a corporate promoter personally lia-
ble to repay a loan made to his corporation before its formation.'1 ' De-
fendant's corporation was never formed. The plaintiff sued, claiming
that the defendant assumed liability by signing the letter acknowledg-
ing receipt of the loan, or that the defendant was liable under the EEC
Act.'72 In affirming the judgment of the trial court, Lord Denning
noted that the word "you" in the letter appeared to refer to tie defen-
dant personally, but he deferred to the determination of the trial
court. 173 The defendant argued that section 9(2) of the EEC Act of
1972 did not apply.' 74 European Economic Community Council Direc-
tive 68/151 of March 9, 1968, 17 was the basis for the EEC Act of
1972.176 Defendant argued that article 7 of the EEC Directive, as writ-
ten in the original French text, would only impose personal liability on
a promoter of a corporation who acted while the corporation was in the
process of formation.177 Defendant could not be liable since he acted on
169. [19811 3 All E.R. 182 (C.A.).
170. Id. at 186.
171. Musicians employed defendant, Brian Lane, as business agent to obtain
financing for their band and Fragile Management, Ltd., the corporation they proposed
to form to manage their business. Defendant obtained a commitment from plaintiff,
Phonogram, Ltd., for £12,000, payable to Jelly Music Ltd. on behalf of Fragile Man-
agement Ltd. (Defendant was a promoter of Fragile Management Ltd. and a director
of Jelly Music Ltd. Plaintiff executed the checks in this way for administrative conve-
nience. Plaintiff sent a letter to defendant with the check, in which it explained, "[iun
the unlikely event that we fail to complete within, say, one month you will undertake to
repay us the £ 6000." Plaintiff asked defendant to sign the letter on a line immediately
above the statement, "for and on behalf of Fragile Management Ltd." Defendant
signed and returned the letter. Id. at 184-85.
172. See supra note 168.
173. Lane, 3 All E.R. at 185.
174. Id. at 186.
175. Hereinafter cited as EEC Directive.
176. Lane, 3 All E.R. at 186.
177. Id. English was not an official language of the European Economic Commu-
nity in 1968. [1981] All E.R. at 186. The EEC Directive provided:
If acts are accomplished on behalf of a corporation while being formed but
before being incorporated and if the corporation does not take back the
obligations resulting from these acts, the people who have performed them
will be jointly and indefinitely liable in the absence of a contrary provision.
Id.
The French text refers to a corporation "en formation," which implies "while being
incorporated." Defendant's argument may fail because the original drafters did not use
the stronger terms "en train d'etre formke," or "en train de se former," which would
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behalf of the corporation before taking any steps to incorporate. The
defendant next argued he could not come within section 9(2) of the
EEC Act of 1972 because he did not "purport" to act for the com-
pany. 8 The defendant disclosed that the company did not yet exist. 17 9
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument without discussion, noting
that "[a] contract can purport to be made on behalf of a company, or
by a company, even though that company is known by both parties not
to be formed and that it is only about to be formed."' 80
C. Summation
The English Bills of Exchange Act influenced development of the
Uniform Commercial Code, and negotiable instruments in England
have substantially the same effect as in the United States. An agent
sued on an instrument may present the same defenses his principal
could assert. A holder in due course takes the instrument free from
personal defenses; a person signing a bill of exchange or promissory
note may wish to avoid negotiability and the possibility that a holder in
due course will sue for payment.
An agent signing a negotiable instrument on behalf of his principal
may avoid negotiability by making a bill of exchange payable to cash,
crossing a check, or failing to comply with requirements in the Bills of
Exchange Act. An agent generally will not be liable on the instrument
if he indicates his representative capacity and identifies his principal,
even if he exceeds his authority. The promoter of a corporation may,
however, be personally liable on an instrument he issues on behalf of
his corporation before it is formed.
refer more closely to the period during which promoters were working to incorporate.
178. Lane, 3 All E.R. at 186.
179. Id.
180. Id. G. CHESHIRE & C.H.S. FIFOOT, LAW OF CONTRACT 462 (9th ed. 1976),
discusses Section 9(2) of the EEC Act of 1972:
[T]his provision makes no change in the position of the company, which
still cannot ratify the contract. It is clearly intended however to increase
the number of cases where the agent is personally liable. How far it in fact
does so will depend on the meaning given to the words "subject to any
agrement to the contary" since it could be argued that words showing that
A signs as agent express an agreement that he is not to be personally
liable.
1984]
27
Cox: Comparative Analysis: Agents' Personal Liability on Negotiable In
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Nova Law Journal
IV. Civil Law Practice and the Geneva Convention
A. Overview
The Geneva Conventions'' are the basis for negotiable instru-
ments law in much of continental Europe.18 Commercial need led to
early attempts to unify commercial law. The Association for the Pro-
gress of Social Sciences first addressed the matter in a congress in
Ghent in 1863.83 In 1908 the Dutch government called an interna-
tional conference at the Hague. In 1912, this conference produced the
first draft of a uniform law.' 84 The League of Nations addressed the
concern in 1928, after the first World War interrupted efforts to codify
a uniform law.' 8 5 Drafters of the Geneva Conventions learned from the
Hague conferences that they could only achieve some degree of unifica-
tion of laws if they attempted merely to reduce the number of commer-
cial law systems to two-the Anglo-American system and the continen-
tal system.'86 Drafters modeled the form of bills of exchange after
German practice and eliminated bills payable to bearer to please the
French.187 Thirty-one states participated in the Geneva Conference
181. Convention Providing a Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes, June 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 259 [hereinafter cited as Bills of Exchange]; Con-
vention Providing a Uniform Law for Cheques, March 19, 1921, 143 L.N.T.S. 355
[hereinafter cited as Cheques Convention].
182. The following nations ratified or acceded to all or part of both Conventions.
For reservations and dates of ratification or accession, see UNITED NATIONS, MULTI-
LATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DE-
POSITORY FUNCTIONS 581-86 (1978), U.N.Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/11 (1978). Greece,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Finland, It-
aly, Japan, Germany, Portugal, Monaco, France, Poland, Brazil, Hungary and Luxem-
bourg. On February 21, 1974, the Secretary-General of the United Nations received
notification that the German Democratic Republic declared reapplication of the Con-
vention beginning June 6, 1958. On January 13, 1976, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many notified the Secretary-General that it would not recognize retroactive application
of the Convention in the German Democratic Republic beyond June 21, 1973. Id.
183. Hamel, The Geneva Conventions on Negotiable Instruments and Methods
of Unifying Private Law, in UNIFICATION OF LAW 270, 275 (1948).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Hudson & Feller, The Internat'l Unification of Laws Concerning Bills of
Exchange, 44 HARV. L. REV. 333, 347 (1931).
187. Hamel, supra note 183, at 276-77.
[Vol. 9
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/3
International Negotiable Instruments
May 13, 1930, through June 7, 1930.188 Participants adopted conven-
tions dealing with uniform law on bills of exchange and promissory
notes, 189 conflicts of laws in connection with bills of exchange and
promissory notes, 190 and stamp laws in connection with bills of ex-
change and promissory notes.' 9 ' On March 19, 1931, participants at a
second conference adopted three conventions unanimously, proposing a
uniform law on checks, conflicts of laws in connection with checks, and
stamp laws in connection with checks. 192 The following section will an-
alyze the law of France to illustrate negotiable instruments practice in
a civil law jurisdiction that has adopted the Geneva Conventions.
B. Practice in France
1. Negotiable Instruments
The Code de Commerce governs negotiable instruments in France
and gives effect to the Geneva Conventions. 9 ' Assignment of debts
generally requires formal notice to the debtor or the debtor's notarized
acceptance. 94 Debts represented by negotiable instruments are more
readily transferable and are better suited to commercial needs.195 Ne-
gotiability under French law is much like its Anglo-American
equivalent. Unlike United States and English provisions restricting ap-
plicability of personal defenses, the French Code de Commerce and the
Geneva Conventions do not distinguish between holders and holders in
due course.'96 Under the French law any holder in good faith receives a
188. Hudson & Feller, supra note 186, at 333. For proceedings of the Confer-
ence, see League of Nations Doc. C. 360. M. 151 11 (1930).
189. See League of Nations Doc. C. 346(1). M. 142(1) 11 (1930).
190. See League of Nations Doc. C. 347(1). M. 143(1) 11 (1930).
191. See League of Nations Doc. C. 348(1). M. 144(1) 11 (1930).
192. Conventions Concerning Negotiable Instruments, UNIFICATION OF LAW 363
(1948).
193. CODE DE COMMERCE art. 110-182 (Dalloz 1981-1982) control bills of ex-
change; art. 183-189 govern promissory notes, and the Decree of October 30, 1935,
modified by Law 72-10, January 3, 1972, and Law 75-4, January 3, 1975, 1935 Dalloz
Periodique et Critique IV 467 [hereinafter cited as Check Laws], controls checks.
194. CODE CIVIL art. 1690 (Dalloz 1981-1982).
195. F. LAWSON, A. ANTON, & L. BROWN, AMOS & WALTON'S INTRODUCTION
TO FRENCH LAW 365 (1967) [hereinafter cited as AMOS & WALTON].
196. 0. GILES, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW 166 (1970). Compare U.C.C. § 3-
305 with Bills of Exchange Act § 29.
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negotiable instrument free from defects in title of earlier parties. 91
French law confers negotiability on a wide variety of instruments, in-
cluding bonds, bills of lading, bills of exchange, promissory notes, and
checks.'9 8 The Code de Commerce refers to bills of exchange, promis-
sory notes, and checks as effects de commerce, and commercial courts
have jurisdiction over all parties to these instruments. 99 The following
sections discuss essential characteristics of effects de commerce under
the French Commercial Code and the Geneva Conventions.
a. Bills of Exchange
A French bill of exchange has an effect similar to its counterpart
in England and to a draft in the United States."' It is a signed and
dated instrument in writing in which the drawer orders the drawee to
pay a sum certain in money to a named payee or his order at a fixed or
determinable time.20' Unlike its United States or English equivalents it
may not be payable to bearer' °2 and a drawer may prevent its transfer
by indorsement by making it payable "non hz ordre.120 3 The drawer has
the responsibility, enforced by fines and imprisonment, 20 4of supplying a
"provision" or fund from which the drawee will pay.205 The holder may
not enforce the bill of exchange until the instrument is stamped and the
stamp tax paid.206
A bill of exchange must contain: the term "bill of exchange" writ-
ten in the text in the language used in drawing the instrument, 207 an
197. Id. AMOS & WALTON, supra note 195, at 365.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See generally id. at 365-37.
201. C. COM. art. 110; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 2; AmIos & WALTON,
supra note 195, at 365.
202. C. COM. art. 110.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g.. CODE PtNAL art. 405 (Dalloz 1981-1982) which treats failure to
provide funds as a type of fraud.
205. C. COM. art. 116.
206. C. COM. art. 147.
207. The drafters of the Bills of Exchange Convention required the label "bill of
exchange" to provide a definite and quick way to distinguish between a bill of exchange
and a check or a promissory note, and to insure that the signer realizes he is entering a
serious legal obligation. Balogh, Critical Remarks on the Law of Bills of Exchange of
the Geneva Convention, 9 TUL. L. REv. 165, 184 (1935).
[Vol. 9
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/3
International Negotiable Instruments
unconditional order to pay a sum certain, the name of the payor
(drawee), a statement of the time of payment, identification of the
place of payment, the name of the person to whom or to whose order
payment is to be made,2"' a statement of the date and place where the
bill was issued, and the signature of the person issuing the bill
(drawer). 09 The signature may be by hand or by any other method.210
A bill of exchange in which the time of payment is not specified is
deemed payable at sight. In the absence of any statement to the con-
trary, the place designated beside the drawee's name is deemed the
place of payment, and also the domicile of the drawee.21' A bill of ex-
change that does not identify the place where it was issued will be
deemed to have been drawn in the place mentioned beside the name of
the drawer.212 If the sum payable on a bill of exchange is expressed
both in words and in numbers, the sum expressed in words will govern
if there is a difference. If the sum payable on a bill of exchange is
expressed more than once in words or more than once in numbers, the
smaller amount will control if there is a difference.2"3
All drawers, acceptors, indorsers, or guarantors by ava1214 of a bill
of exchange are jointly and severally liable to the holder.21 5 The holder
has the right to proceed against all these people, individually or collec-
tively, without being required to follow the order in which they became
bound.216 Anyone who signs a bill of exchange and pays the holder
enjoys the same right the holder possessed. 17 Filing suit, by the holder,
against one of the parties, on the instrument does not constitute an
208. Compare Anglo-American practice requiring merely that the payee be iden-
tified with reasonable certainty. U.C.C. § 3-110; Bills of Exchange Act § 7.
209. C. COM. art. 110. Compare Bills of Exchange Convention art. 1, which does
not include the second clause of requirement (8).
210. Id.
211. Domicile is relevant in choice of law questions. See infra notes 417-423 and
accompanying text.
212. C. coai. art. 110; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 2. Place of issue is
relevant in choice of questions. See infra notes 417-423 and accompanying text.
213. C. COM. art. 113; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 6.
214. An aval is a guarantee of payment written on the bills or on an allonge. See
Bills of Exchange Convention art. 31; C. COM. art. 130. A guarantor may create an
aval with the signed statement "good as aval" or "bon pour aval," or any similar provi-
sion. Id.
215. C. coM. art. 151; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 47.
216. C. COM. art. 151; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 47.
217. Id. Compare the doctrine of subrogation in United States practice codified
in U.C.C. § 3-415(5).
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election of remedies and does not preclude later suit against the others,
even if they became obligated on the instrument after the person plain-
tiff sued first.2"8
b. Checks
France adopted the Checques Convention into its Code de Com-
merce by the Decree of October 30, 1935.219 Provisions related to
checks in both the French Code and the Cheques Convention are simi-
lar to those dealing with bills of exchange.22 The following discussion
addresses significant characteristics of checks and differences between
checks and bills of exchange.22'
A check is a written instrument by which a drawer orders a bank
or a similar financial institution to pay a sum certain on demand to a
specified person, his order, or to bearer.22 If a check specifies the payee
it may be negotiated by indorsement 23 The drawer may be subject to
criminal penalties if he does not provide the drawee adequate funds to
cover the check.224
The Cheques Convention and the French Check laws provide
stricter formal requirements than the English Bills of Exchange Act or
the United States Uniform Commercial Code. A check must contain
the term "cheque" in the body of the instrument in the language used
in the rest of the instrument, an unconditional order to pay a sum cer-
tain in money, the name of the drawee, identification of place of pay-
ment, statement of date and place that the check is drawn, and the
drawer's signature.225 The drawee will not be liable on the instrument
218. C. COM. art. 151; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 47.
219. 1935 PERIODIQUE ET CRITIQUE IV 467.
220. See generally AMOS & WALTON, supra note 195, 365-68.
221. The following discussion will not address French use of postal checks. In
1918 the French government attacked a wartime shortage of cash by establishing a
check service under direction of the postal administration. AMos & WALTON, supra.
note 195, at 369. Depositors may open accounts at post offices and then draw checks
against funds deposited in their names. The Cheque Convention does not address postal
checks and postal checks are governed by laws different from those controlling checks
drawn on banks. Id. See Decree 62-273, 1962 BULLETIN LGISLATIF DALLOZ 170
(Mar. 12, 1962).
222. Check Laws art. 1, § 3 Cf. Cheque Convention art. 3, which provides that a
check may only be drawn on a banker.
223. Check Laws art. 1, §§ 13, 17; Cheque Convention arts. 14, 17.
224. See, e.g., C. PtN. art. 405.
225. Check Laws art. 1, § 5; Cheque Convention art. 1.
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if the drawer fails to deposit adequate funds to pay the check,"2 6 and
the drawee may not accept a check. 227 The Check laws add that a pur-
ported acceptance is void (deemed "non &rite"), but the drawee may
initial the check to show that the drawer has provided adequate funds
to cover the check.228
c. Promissory Note
A promissory note contains the clause "to order" or the term
"promissory note" written in the text of the instrument in the same
language as the rest of the instrument, 229 and the following: an uncon-
ditional promise to pay a sum certain, a statement of the time of pay-
ment, a statement of the place where payment is to be made, the name
of the person to whom or to whose order payment is to be made, 3  a
statement of the date and place where the note was issued and the
signature of the person who issued the instrument (maker).23 ' A prom-
issory note that does not specify the time of payment is payable at
sight.23 2 In the absence of an explicit indication to the contrary, the
place where the instrument is issued is deemed to be the place of pay-
ment and the maker's domicile. 233 A promissory note that does not
state the place where it was issued is deemed to have been made at the
place mentioned beside the name of the maker.2 34 The maker of a
promissory note is liable in the same way as an acceptor of a bill of
exchange.235
2. Liability on the Instrument
Both the French Commercial Code and the Geneva Conventions
permit limited disclaimers of liability. In the absence of a provision to
226. Check Laws art. 1, § 3.
227. Check Laws art. 1, § 4; Cheque Convention art. 4.
228. Check Laws art. 1, § 4.
229. Cf. Bills of Exchange Convention art. 75, which requires "promissory note"
to be written in all cases.
230. Compare Anglo-American practice requiring merely that the payee be iden-
tified with reasonable certainty. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-110, Bills of Exchange Act § 7.
231. C. coM. art. 183; Bills of Exchange Convention.
232. C. com. art. 184; Bills of Exchange Convention.
233. Id. The maker's domicile and the placer of issue are relevant in choice of
law determinations. See infra notes 417-23 and accompanying text.
234. Id.
235. C. COM. art. 188; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 78.
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the contrary the indorser of a bill of exchange guarantees both accept-
ance and payment.23 6 He may prohibit any later indorsement, in which
case he does not make any guarantee to the person to whom the bill of
exchange is ultimately indorsed.2 37 The drawer also guarantees both ac-
ceptance and payment.2 38 He may release himself from guaranteeing
acceptance, but unlike an indorser, he may not release himself from the
guarantee of payment.23 9 The drawer of a check guarantees payment
and any statement purporting to release him from this guarantee will
be void.240 The indorser of a check guarantees payment in the absence
of a contrary stipulation.2 4'
The French Commercial Code's restriction on use of personal de-
fenses is similar to treatment of rights of holders in due course under
U.C.C. section 3-305. A person sued on a bill of exchange or a check
may not raise a defense based on his relations with the drawer or with
previous holders unless the holder knowingly acted to the debtor's det-
riment in acquiring the bill.242 These provisions are a compromise be-
tween the pre-Geneva Convention French and German rules that a
plaintiff could not maintain a cause of action if he knew of the debtor's
defenses when he acquired the instrument and the stricter view that a
plaintiff should prevail unless a plaintiff and the previous holder con-
spired to injure the debtor.24 3 The 1928 draft convention held that a
plaintiff's bad faith was a defense to suit on the instrument. The Ge-
neva Convention rejected this rule as too great an impediment to nego-
tiabiltiy.244 The Geneva Convention and the French Commercial Code
in effect define bad faith2 45 A majority of the delegates believed that
236. C. COM. art. 119; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 15. Compare U.C.C. §
3-414(1) which provides that "[u]nless the indorsement otherwise specifies... every
indorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice of dishonor and protest
he will pay the instrument according to its tenor .. " Id.
237. C. coM. art. 119; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 15.
238. C. COM. art. 115; Bills of Exchange Convention.
239. C. COM. 115; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 9. Any provision purporting
to release him from the guarantee of payment will be deemed not not written, "non
&rite."
240. Cheque Convention art. 12; Check Laws art. I § 12.
241. Cheque Convention art. 18; Check Laws art. 1 § 18.
242. For treatment of liability on bills of exchange, see Bills of Exchange Con-
vention art. 17; C. COM. art. 121. For treatment of liability on checks, see Cheque
Convention art. 22; Check Laws art. 1 § 22.
243. 0. GILES, supra note 196, at 167.
244. Id.
245. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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mere knowledge of defenses should not prevent a holder from asserting
a claim, but knowledge and intent to injure the debtor at the time the
holder acquired the instrument should be a defense.246 The French,
German, Austrian, and the Italian courts of last resort have all ad-
dressed the issue: when does a holder act knowingly to the debtor's
detriment by acquiring a negotiable instrument and thereby permit the
debtor to assert a personal defense?247
Several illustrative holdings indicate the scope of personal de-
fenses. If a holder has actual knowledge of a defense at the time he
acquires the instrument and he knows that he will deprive defendant of
that defense if he acquires it, his suit on the instrument will fail.24s If
the plaintiff knew of the business transaction between the drawer and
the previous holder but did not know details of the dispute, the defen-
dant may not assert the personal defense in an action on the instru-
ment.249 If facts surrounding the negotiation placed the plaintiff on no-
tice that the defendant could have pleaded fraud in defending a suit by
an earlier holder and that the earlier holder negotiated the instrument
to avoid that defense, the plaintiff's suit will fail even if he does not
know the exact basis for the claim of fraud.250 If a holder has reason to
know of defenses, and knows that he will injure the defendant by ac-
quiring the instrument, the defendant may maintain a successful de-
fense.25 If the defendant shows that a holder was grossly negligent in
failing to take precautions that a reasonably prudent businessman
should take, and if the holder had taken those precautions he would
have known of a defense, a court will exercise a rebuttable presumption
that the holder had actual knowledge of the defense.252
A court generally will consider a holder's state of mind at the time
he acquires a negotiable instrument. If the holder had no knowledge of
a defense when he obtained the instrument but later did something
closely related to the acquisition which damaged defendant, a court
will find that the later action related back to the time of acquisition.2 53
246. 0. GILES, supra note 196, at 167.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 168. For example, if the drawer of a bill of exchange sells goods to
the acceptor but fails to deliver the goods, and then discounts the bill to a bank that is
aware of the fraud, the acceptor may maintain a defense.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 168-69.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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3. Rationale for Personal Liability
The French Civil Code imposes almost strict liability for injuries
caused by "[a]ny act by anyone which causes any injury to another,
obliges the wrongdoer to repair the injury."254 The phrase "any act"
implies strict liability, but mention of the word "fault" suggests a more
lenient standard. This provision is ambiguous and courts sometimes
hold a principal liable for unauthorized acts of agents under this provi-
sion.155 Courts recently have turned toward application of apparent au-
thority to avoid broad interpretation of this act.256 Other authorities
explain that a business agent is responsible for damage to third parties
caused by his fault in the execution of his contract.257 Reference to
fault again implies less than strict liability.
In addition to personal liability for injuries he causes, an agent is
liable on the instrument if he exceeds his authority in issuing a negotia-
ble instrument. The French Commercial Code adopted article 8 of the
Bills of Exchange Convention. Anyone who signs a bill of exchange as
an agent for a person for whom he did not have authority to act is
personally bound on the instrument, and if he pays, he will have the
same rights that the claimed principal would have. 58 This rule treats
an agent who exceeds his authority in the same way as an agent who
acts without authority.25 9 The Report of the Drafting Committee inter-
prets this article to provide that an agent who executes a bill of ex-
change for an amount greater than he is authorized will be liable for
the full amount, not just for the amount by which the bill exceeds his
authorized limit.2 60 If one person without authority or capacity signs an
instrument, however, other signatures on the instrument remain
valid.261 Other authorities note that a third party may not take advan-
tage of his own negligence in failing to discover the scope of an agent's
authority when the agent signs without authority to bind his
254. "Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause d autrui un dommage, oblige
celui par la faute duquel il est arriv6, A le reparer." C. civ. art. 1382.
255. See infra text accompanying notes 313-318.
256. See, e.g., Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Directeur G6n6ral des Impots,
1963 Dalloz, Jurisprudence 277 (Cass. Ass. Plen. 1962).
257. 1 ENCYCLOPtDIE DALLOZ, Agent d'Affaires § 87 (1956).
258. C. coM. art. 114. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-404(1).
259. Id.
260. Hudson & Feller, supra note 186, at 351.
261. C. coM. art. 114; Bills of Exchange Convention art. 7.
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principal.26
In addition to liability on the instrument, if the agent exceeds his
authority, he may be liable for breach of warranty of authority. If an
agent's lack of authority injures a third party who in good faith relies
on the agent's manifestation of authority to bind the principal, the
third party may hold the purported agent liable, 63 but generally will
have no cause of action against the principal. 64 An agent may, how-
ever, disclaim this implied warranty. An agent who exceeds his author-
ity after giving a third party adequate notice of its proper scope will
not be liable unless he is personally bound on the contract.265 The law
is unclear as to what constitutes adequate disclosure but the agent
should show the third party the mandat, or agreement, authorizing him
to act along with all other relevant documents.
4. Signature by Agent
An agent may sign a negotiable instrument on the principal's be-
half.266 If the agent is authorized to sign the instrument only the princi-
pal is bound, provided that the instrument clearly acknowledges repre-
sentative capacity of the signature. If the agent's representative
capacity does not appear on the instrument, even if the agent signed for
the principal, the agent assumes personal liability on the negotiable in-
strument. 67 If the third party has actual knowledge of the agency rela-
tionship; however, the principal may be liable.26 a If a person claiming
to represent another signs as if he were an agent, but he either has no
authority or exceeds his authority, he will be personally obligated.269
An agent under the French Code may obtain authority by opera-
tion of law under a statute or court order, or by contract with the per-
262. See I ENCYCLOPtDIE DALLOz, Agent d'Affaires § 88 (1956).
263. Cf. C. civ. art. 1997. See infra text accompanying note 265.
264. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, 6 TRAITE PRACTIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN;AIS
70 (1952).
265. C. civ. art. 1997.
266. R. RODItRE, DROIT COMMERCIAL 21 (7th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as R.
RODItRE] For implicit recognition of an agent's authority to sign a bill of exchange on
his principal's behalf, see Bill of Exchange Convention art. 8, C. COM. art. 114. For
similar treatment of agents who sign checks, see Cheque Convention art. 11, Check
Laws art. 1, § 11.
267. C. COM. art. 114, Check Laws art. 1, § 11.
268. C. COM. art. 114, Check Laws art. 1, § 11.
269. C. COM. art. 114, Check Laws art. 1, § 11.
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son he represents.17 1 When there is a voluntary or consensual agency
relation, the principal confers authority by an act termed the procura-
tion or mandat.2 71 The procuration must follow the form prescribed by
law only if the underlying transaction is one that the law was designed
to govern and if the statute requires the prescribed form in the interests
of the parties 272 The procuration does not need to be written, 273 but the
prudent legal advisor will require a written contract for evidentiary
purposes. The contract creating an agency relation may be a public act
or document, a simple contract, or even a letter.2 74 It may be given
orally, but if there is a dispute the agency contract may only be proven
according to strict limitations prescribed in the Civil Code title "Con-
tracts or Conventional Obligations in General."'27 5 Acceptance of the
agency contract may be implied, and will then empower the agent to
bind the principal in matters within the scope of the authority
granted.276
The French Civil Code prevents unjust enrichment by recognizing
a principle related to the Anglo-American equitable doctrine of quasi
contract. The agent may bind the principal despite absence of pre-ex-
isting authority or ratification of the agent's act benefited the princi-
pal.277 The principal must satisfy all obligations contracted on his be-
half by his agent, and should reimburse the agent for all useful or
necessary expenses the agent incurred in a properly managed business
transaction.278 Planiol and Ripert note that by conferring representative
authority on anyone who, in certain situations, acts for the benefit of
another, this article supports the policy of avoiding unjust
enrichment.2 "
French businesses employ four general kinds of agents:
representants salaries, voyageurs-representants-placiers (V.R.P.s.
or representants statutaires), agents commerciaux, and representants
mandataires.280 The French Labor Code governs transactions with the
270. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 67.
271. C. civ. art. 1984.
272. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT at 67.
273. C. civ. art. 1985.
274. Id. art. 1985.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT at 71-72, citing C. civ. art. 1375.
278. C. civ. art. 1375.
279. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 72.
280. Hay & Miiller-Freienfels, Agency in the Conflict of Laws and the 1978
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representant salarie and the V.R.P.281 The V.R.P. enjoys special rights
but he may not engage in business on his own behalf or he will lose his
special status.218 Agents commerciaux are subject to Decree 58-1345 of
Decmeber 23, 1958. The French Civil Code governs agents
mandataires28 3 and defines the term as:
[A] representative who ordinarily carries on independently and
professionally (and otherwise than as an employee) the activity of
the negotiation or conclusion of contracts for the sale, purchase, or
letting on lease or hire of goods or other property, or the provision
of services, for and on behalf of manufacturers, producers or
merchants.2"4
A commercial agency contract must be written,285 and a commercial
agent may practice only after he registers in the commercial court.28 6
The National Federation of Commercial Agents prepares standard
form contracts providing a statement identifying principal and agent, a
statement specifying the scope of the agent's authority, conditions for
exercising authority, commission, duration of relation, amendment pro-
cedures, and dispute resolution. 87 Professor Guyenot 8a discussed the
role of the commercial agent:
The negotiation or conclusion of a contract by a commercial agent
does not involve him in liability to third parties who deal with him,
provided he acts within the limits of his authority, and they can not
have recourse to him if the principal does not fulfill his obligations
under the contract.289
Hague Convention, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 13 (1979).
281. CODE DE TRAVAIL art. L. 751-1 (Dalloz 1981-1982).
282. Hay & Miiller-Freienfels, supra note 280, at 13.
283. C. civ. art. 1984.
284. Decree of December 23, 1958, reprinted in and translated by G. GUYENOT,
THE FRENCH LAW OF AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENTS 23 (1976).
285. G. GUYENOT, supra note 284, at 46, citing Decree of December 23, 1958,
art. 1(2).
286. G. GUYENOT, supra note 284, at 73, 75, citing Decree of December 23,
1958, art. 4, as amended by Decree of August 22, 1968, supplemented by Order of
August 22, 1968.
287. G. GUYENOT, supra note 284, at 48.
288. M. Guyenot is Chief Assistant in the Faculty of Law and Economic and
Social Sciences at the University of Paris.
289. G. GUYENOT, supra note 284, at 51.
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The remainder of the discussion of French agency law will focus
on the mandataire libre, or contractual agent. Because this type of
agency is purely consensual, characteristics of the agency relation vary
substantially. Authority may terminate by agreement between the par-
ties, by death of principal or agent, or by the bankruptcy of the princi-
pal.2 90 The Civil Code permits the agent to continue acting on behalf of
the principal until he learns that his power has terminated. 29 1 The
agent must continue to act even after he learns of his principal's death
if his failure to act could cause damage to the principal's estate. 92
5. Scope of Authority
The French Civil Code appears initially to construe agents' au-
thority strictly. The need to protect innocent third parties and to fur-
ther the negotiability of commercial instruments has led to a more lib-
eral interpretation of the Code. Whereas the English language
distinguishes between an agent's "authority" to act on behalf of a prin-
cipal and an agent's "power" to bind a principal,2 93 French texts use
the single word "pouvoir," which is a vaguer term denoting "power,"
or "ability to act." This linguistic difference causes interpretation of
the codes, treatises, and judicial opinions to be more difficult and
causes discussion of agent's liability to be less clear.
The Civil Code defines actual authority strictly. The agent may
not exceed the authority he received in the agency agreement; author-
ity to negotiate does not include authority to compromise the princi-
pal's rights.294 The agency agreement written in general terms only em-
powers the agent to perform administrative acts.295 If the agent intends
to alienate or pledge the principal's property the agency agreement
must provide expressly that the agent has such authority.296
Although the scope of an agent's actual authority may be con-
strued strictly, the Code treats its duration broadly. An agent's repre-
sentative capacity does not befin or end until the agent has actual no-
290. Id. at 148.
291. Id. at 63.
292. C. civ. art. 1991(2); G. GUYENOT, supra note 284, at 63.
293. "Authority" connotes rightful conduct; "power" denotes conduct that may
exceed the authority that the agent received from the principal.
294. C. civ. art. 1989.
295. C. clv. art. 1988.
296. Id.
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tice of the fact beginning or terminating his authority,"' or until he
receives a notification required by law.298 If a principal restricts or re-
vokes an agent's authority, even if he properly notifies the agent, he
may not assert this change in status as a defense to claims by third
parties who acted in good faith299 without knowledge of the change.300
In order to end all powers of the agent, the principal must notify third
parties according to statutory requirements for publicizing the change
or in the manner most likely to give the third parties actual notice of
the revocation of the agent's authority.30' The principal may require
the agent to return any document declaring the agent's representative
authority.0 2 This may not, however, be adequate notice to third parties
to free the principal from liability for later contracts the agent enters
on the principal's behalf.303 What constitutes adequate notice remains
unclear. A principal revoking or reducing an agent's authority should
give actual notice to all people with whom the agent has dealt and
should take reasonable measures to notify those with whom the agent is
likely to deal.
French courts recognize the need for predictability in business re-
lations and, therefore, sometimes find that an agent binds his principal
even when the agent exceeds his authority or acts without any author-
ity.304 The resulting judicial interpretations of the Civil Code resemble
apparent authority in Anglo-American law and inherent power in
United States practice. French courts are willing to protect a third
party who relies reasonably and in good faith on the appearance of
authority, if the purported principal is responsible for the appearance
of authority or if the third party relied on the existence of authority
normally granted to a permanent employee in the agent's position. 30 5
In some cases, statutes create an irrebutable presumption of au-
thority. Statutes creating limited liability corporations render any con-
tractual limitation on an agent's authority invalid as related to third
parties.306 Although the agent may have power to bind the principal he
297. C. civ. art. 2008.
298. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 69.
299. C. civ. art. 2009; M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 69.
300. C. civ. art. 2005; M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 69.
301. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 69.
302. C. civ. art. 2004.
303. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 69.
304. Id. at 70.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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may be liable to the principal for exceeding his authority under the
contract. The French Cours de Cassation Civil met in plenary assembly
and extended the doctrine of apparent authority in Banque Canadienne
Nationale v. Directeur General des Impots. 07 The defendant relied on
Civil Code provisions and earlier judicial opinions to argue that it could
only be obligated on the instrument if it had acted in bad faith or given
actual authority to the director to sign the instrument on its behalf.
Since neither was applicable, the bank argued it should not be held
liable. The Cours de Cassation, however, found the defendant liable
under a new rule: an agent may bind his principal by exercise of appar-
ent authority, even if the principal is without fault, if the third party's
belief as to the extent of the agent's powers is reasonable and the cir-
cumstances justify the third party's failure to verify the precise scope of
the agent's authority. It is significant that the court did not refer to any
provisions of the French codes, rather it based its decision on a finding
that the agent acted within the normal scope of authority for a person
holding his office.
The commentator, Professor Jean Calais-Auloy, found the court in
Banque Canadienne Nationale had abandoned earlier established law
and recognized a new legal principle. The plaintiff did not assert that
the defendant held out the agent as having authority, or that it relied
on the defendant's representations implying that the agent had author-
ity. Calais-Auloy noted that the decision appeared inconsistent with the
Civil Code.308 Public policy, however, supported the decision.30 9 Busi-
nessmen must be certain of the validity of their acts without compli-
cated and time-consuming research. It is especially important for peo-
ple dealing with a company's agent to be able to rely on the agent's
apparent authority without painstaking study of corporate bylaws. 310
Professor Calais-Auloy questioned the efficacy of the holding. He
noted that modern business' need for quick decisions is not new; law
307. 1963 D. Jur. 277 (Cass. Ass. Plen. 1962). The president- director general of
the Canadian National Bank signed for the bank as surety on an instrument for fr.
700,000. The president did not have authority to bind the bank; the corporation's by-
laws required two signatures. When the drawee failed to pay the instrument, plaintiff
sued the bank. Id.
308. Id. The Civil. Code provides that a principal is bound by contracts entered
by his agent while the agent is acting within the scope of his authority; the principal is
only bound by his agent's ultra vires acts if the principal ratifies the acts expressly or
implicitly. C. civ. art. 1998.
309. 1963 D. Jur. at 277.
310. Id.
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has evolved to satisfy this need since the beginning of the century.311
Calais-Auloy noted that legislators might in the future fix the authority
of all agents as they had the authority of agents of limited liability
corporations.312
Before the Banque Canadienne Nationale opinion, courts based li-
ability of a principal for unauthorized acts of agents on a theory of
fault. 313 Courts invoked two provisions: article 1382 of the Civil Code,
which created liability for the defendant's own wrongful act and article
1384(5), which created liability for acts of defendant's managing of-
ficers and directors.314 Courts based corporate liability on article 1382
by finding that the principal acted wrongfully by concealing from third
parties the limitation on the agent's authority, and by holding that this
concealment injured innocent third parties who relied on the incorrect
belief that they were creditors of the principal." 5 Courts found that the
most adequate compensation to third parties was to hold the principal a
debtor to the contracting third party as if the agent had acted within
the scope of his authority.316 Unlike article 1382, article 1384(5) does
not impose liability on a principal for his personal fault, but for the
fault of an agent acting in a supervisory role. This provision has the
practical and theoretical advantage of imposing liability for the clear
fault of the agent rather than on the uncertain fault of the principal.1 7
As in suits under article 1382, the injured third party may have the
court require the principal to pay as if the agent acted within the scope
of his authority.318
6. Ratification
An agent who is personally liable on a negotiable instrument be-
cause he exceeded the scope of his authority1 9 may escape liability to a
third party by his principal's explicit or implicit ratification of his
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. "The judges... preferred to rely on the solid ground of Civil Code arts.
1382 et seq. rather than on the quicksand of apparent authority." [translation by
author].
314. Id. See C. civ. § 1382.
315. 1963 D. Jur. 277.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 278.
318. Id.
319. See C. cor, . art. 114, Check Laws § 11.
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act.3 20 Not only will ratification cause a principal to become bound on
an instrument his agent executed without authority;321 ratification will
also confer actual authority to commit the act the agent already per-
formed. 22 Courts often find ratification, which relates back to the time
of the act, when an agent exceeds his authority or when the court finds
an apparent agency. 23 Ratification is a unilateral manifestation of con-
sent expressed by the principal or by a person authorized to act on his
behalf and it may occur at any time. 24 Although ratification may free
an agent from liability to a third party on a negotiable instrument, his
obligation to the principal is governed by a separate contract. The
agent, therefore, may be liable off the instrument for breach of his em-
ployment contract.
C. Summation
The Genva Conventions on negotiable instruments influenced com-
mercial law in continental Europe and Japan. The French experience is
typical; France adopted the rigid rules of the Convention into its Code
de Commerce. The French Commercial Code and the Geneva Conven-
tions on negotiable instruments prescribe rules similar to those gov-
erning negotiable instruments in the United States and England. An
agent who signs a negotiable instrument will be personally liable unless
the face of the instrument makes his representative capacity clearly ap-
parent and he signs with authority of the person he represents. The
existence and the scope of representative authority are essential issues
in determination of who is liable on the instrument. The French Civil
Code construes an agent's authority strictly. The Cours de Cassation,
however, appears willing to expand the statutory provisions to include
representative capacity analogous to apparent authority or inherent
power in United States practice.
V. Choice of Law
The essential similarity between commercial law among western
nations reduces somewhat the importance of choice of law principles.
320. C. civ. art. 1998.
321. Id.
322. M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 264, at 71.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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However, differences in local law remain and a substantial body of le-
gal theory has evolved to aid courts in determination of which local law
to apply. Each legal system balances concerns of party autonomy and
power to contract for application of a chosen law with a need for judi-
cial predictability and fear of overreaching. The following analysis dis-
cusses the efficacy of choice of law clauses and principles for selecting
local law in the absence of express provisions in the instruments.
A. United States
The Uniform Commercial Code and developing precedent32 fur-
ther party autonomy by permitting choice of applicable law, providing
that the parties select law of a state bearing a reasonable reaction to
the transaction.3 26 This limitation protects parties in a weak bargaining
position from overreaching by a more powerful potential adversary. It
also protects an overburdened judicial system from having to research
and apply the law of distant states and nations when application of the
law of the foreign jurisdiction is not foreseeable-and perhaps not de-
sired by at least one party to the transaction. Section 1-105(1) states
the Code's basic choice of law principles:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or
nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Fail-
ing such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an ap-
propriate relation to this state.327
The drafting of the first sentence is unfortunate. The drafters intended
to permit parties to an instrument to select the law of any state with a
reasonable connection to the transaction.32 As written, however, if a
325. The following discussion of United States choice of law rules is included as
a basis for comparison with English and Continental approaches. For a more thorough
discussion, see Nordstrom & Ramerman, The Uniform Commercial Code and The
Choice of Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 623; Tuchler, Boundaries to Party Autonomy in the
Uniform Commercial Code; a Radical View, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 180 (1967); Nord-
strom, Choice of Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 364
(1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 213-218 (1971).
326. See Annot., 63 A.L.R. 3d 341 (1975).
327. Section 1-105(2) states exceptions to the general rule that are not relevant
to discussion of negotiable instruments under article 3.
328. See U.C.C. § 1-105 official comment 1.
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party brings suit in a state that does not have a reasonable relation to
the instrument courts of that state may not be bound by the parties'
otherwise appropriate choice of law. 329
The term "agree" in Section 1-105(1) may include an implied un-
derstanding that the law of a certain state or nation should govern the
transaction.3 30 The Code does not define "agree," but provides that
"agreement" means "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance. 3 1 If a transac-
tion has the closest connection with a jurisdiction other than the forum,
the parties did not specify the applicable law, and the parties are most
familiar with the law of the foreign jurisdiction, then courts should ap-
ply that jurisdiction's law. 3 2
The United States Supreme Court defined the appropriate stan-
dard3 33 for a "reasonable relation" in Seeman v. Philadelphia Ware-
house.33 4 The unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stone found the
place where the parties contracted irrelevant.-3 The Court recognized
the general rule that contracts are governed by the law of the jurisdic-
329. See Nordstrom & Ramerman, supra note 325, at 623, 629.
330. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
331. Id. (emphasis added).
332. Nordstrom & Ramerman, supra note 325, at 632.
333. U.C.C. § 1-105 official comment 1.
334. 274 U.S. 403 (1927). In Seeman, defendant pledged canned salmon to
plaintiff as collateral for a loan. Plaintiff executed a promissory note that named itself
debtor and that was payable to its own order. Plaintiff indorsed the note, discounted it
to its note banker, and forwarded the proceeds to the borrower-after subtracting a
commission of 3% per year for its services, the brokerage fee and discount. Defendant
agreed to repay the face amount of the loans at the end of one year or to pay additional
ch arges to refinance for another year. The effective interest rate varied between 8 %
and 10 % but the maximum legal rate for interest on loans was 6% under the laws of
New York and Pennsylvania. Plaintiff sued for conversion when defendant fraudulently
regained possession and sold the pledged salmon. Defendant argued that the transac-
tion involved a usurious loan, New York law applied and New York law made the
entire transaction void. Plaintiff argued that it made a loan of credit rather than of
money so the usury limits did not apply; even if the transaction were a usurious loan,
Pennsylvania law should apply to enforce repayment of principal and the maximum
legal rate of interest. Plaintiff was a Pennsylvania corporation, had its only place of
business in Pennsylvania, and required repayment of the loan in Pennsylvania. Defen-
dant argued that New York law applied since the parties conducted negotiations in
New York and plaintiff forwarded the funds to the borrower in New York. Id. at 404-
07.
335. Id. at 407.
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tion where they are to be performed.336 The law permitted plaintiff to
lend money to borrowers outside the state and to require repayment
within and according to the laws of plaintiff's state.337 Justice Stone
noted an exception to the rule allowing parties the power to select the
law governing the contract: the parties must act in good faith.,38 The
Court limited the scope of the rule:
The effect of the qualification is merely to prevent the evasion or
avoidance at will of the usury law otherwise applicable, by the par-
ties' entering into the contract or stipulating for its performance at
a place which has no normal relation to the transaction and to
whose law they would not otherwise be subject. . . . Assuming
their real, bona fide intention was to fix the situs of the contract at
a certain place which has a natural and vital connection with the
transaction, the fact that they were actuated in so doing by an in-
tention to obtain a higher rate of interest than is allowable by the
situs of some of the other elements of the transaction does not pre-
vent the application of the law allowing the higher rate.339
The Court concluded by noting that the plaintiff contracted for
payment in the forum where it was incorporated and where it con-
ducted its business. The selection of Pennsylvania law was not frivo-
lous, and was binding on the parties because Pennsylvania had a rea-
sonable relation to the transaction. 40
In Morgan Walton Properties, Inc. v. International City Bank &
Trust Co.,341 the Florida Supreme Court held that the Louisiana usury
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 408.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 409.
341. 404 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1981). Defendants argued that the Florida criminal
usury statute applied and that it made the entire obligation unenforceable. See FLA.
STAT. § 687.071(2) (1972). The trial court held that Louisiana law applied and that
under Louisiana law there was no limit to interest chargeable to a corporation. 404 So.
2d at 1061. Defendants appealed and the Fifth Circuit certified the following question
to the Florida Supreme Court:
Are notes executed and payable in a state other than Florida, secured by a
mortgage on Florida real estate, providing for interest legal where made,
but usurious under Florida law, unenforceable in Florida courts due to
Florida's usury statute, public policy or otherwise, where (a) the interest
charged or paid exceeds 25 percent and (b) where the interest charged
does not exceed 25 percent, but exceeds the maximum interest rate al-
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statute should govern promissory notes executed in Louisiana but se-
cured by a mortgage on property in Florida.342 The Florida Supreme
Court noted that the law of the state where the parties entered into and
performed the contract traditionally governed the contract's validity
and interpretation.3 43 In an earlier case decided the same year, how-
ever, the Florida Supreme Court found that this traditional rule for
choice of law "is today of little practical value since these contacts are
so easily manipulated in our mobile society. ' 344 The Morgan Walton
Properties court held that Florida would apply Louisiana law to uphold
the parties' express or implied intent since Louisiana had a normal and
reasonable relation to the notes,345 the parties implicitly or explicitly
had agreed to be bound by Louisiana law,346 and Florida did not have a
sufficiently strong public policy to justify adoption of Florida law.347
The Morgan Walton Properties opinion relied heavily on Conti-
nental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc.,348 in which the Flor-
ida Supreme Court reversed a lower court's holding that Florida's
usury law was applicable to a financing agreement between a Florida
corporation and a Massachusetts business trust. The district court of
appeal349 found that Massachusetts had no substantial connection to
the transaction and that the parties selected Massachusetts law solely
to avoid strong public policy expressed in the Florida usury law. On
appeal the Florida Supreme Court reversed and found that Massachu-
setts did have a reasonable relation to the transaction. 350 The Florida
lowed by law?
International Civil Bank and Trust Co. v. Morgan Walton Properties, Inc., 612 F.2d
227, 229 (5th Cir. 1980).
342. Morgan Walton Properties, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 1063.
343. Id. at 1061, citing Brown v. Case, 80 Fla. 703, 86 So. 684 (1920); Thomp-
son v. Pyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897); Perry v. Lewis, 6 Fla. 555 (1856).
344. Morgan Walton Properties, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 1062, quoting Continental
Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507, 510 (Fla. 1981).
345. Id. at. 1062-63. The court cited Seeman as it held courts should honor the
parties' choice of law if the choice bore a reasonable relation to the transaction, "even
if the parties' purpose in making ft was to avoid the restrictive effects of Florida's usury
law." Id. at 1063.
346. Id. at 1063.
347. Id.
348. 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981) [hereinafter cited as CMI].
349. Sailboat Key, Inc. v. Continental Mortgage Investors, 354 So. 2d 67 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
350. CMI, 395 So. 2d at 513. One of the parties was a Massachusetts business
trust with offices in Massachusetts, and the parties executed the agreement in Massa-
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public policy against usury was not strong enough to invalidate the par-
ties' choice of law even if they were motivated primarily be a desire to
avoid Florida's usury statute." 1
Drafters of the Code wanted to achieve as high a degree of uni-
formity in the law as possible. Only Pennsylvania had enacted the Code
by the time the drafters finished the first revision of section 1-105,351
and the Pennsylvania legislature may not have foreseen the nearly
unanimous enactment of the Code. Because the drafters preferred to
have cases decided according to the U.C.C., they provided in the sec-
ond sentence of section 1-105(1), so that the forum's version of the
code should govern if the parties did not select another jurisdiction's
law and if the forum bore an appropriate relation to the transaction. 53
What constitutes an appropriate relation remains unclear. The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts discussed this provision in In-
dustrial National Bank of Rhode Island v. Leo's Used Car Exchange,
Inc. 3 4 as it held that Massachusetts law applied to a transaction in
which a Massachusetts corporation drew a check on a Massachusetts
bank payable to an automobile dealer in Connecticut and cashed by a
bank in Rhode Island.3 55 The court noted that Rhode Island, Connecti-
cut, and Massachusetts each bore a reasonable relation to the transac-
tion and the parties could have stipulated that the law of any of these
states should apply. 356 Because the parties did not explicitly choose the
applicable law and because Massachusetts bore an appropriate relation
to the transaction, the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code
governed.3 5
7
The Code gives preference to the forum's version of the U.C.C. if
the parties fail to agree upon applicable law;358 however, the Code does
not encourage application of the forum's non-U.C.C. substantive
law.359 Courts must apply traditional choice of law rules to determine
chusetts. Id. at 508.
351. Id. at 509.
352. See Note, Conflicts of Laws and the "Appropriate Relation" Test of Sec-
tion 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 797, 801 (1971-
1972).
353. See U.C.C. § 1-105 official comment 2.
354. 362 Mass. 797, 291 N.E.2d 603 (1973).
355. Id. at 800, 291 N.E.2d at 605.
356. Id. at 800 n.3, 291 N.E.2d at 605 n.3.
357. Id. at 800, 291 N.E.2d at 605.
358. See U.C.C. § 1-105 official comment 2.
359. Id.
1984]
49
Cox: Comparative Analysis: Agents' Personal Liability on Negotiable In
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Nova Law Journal
applicable law if the forum does not bear an appropriate relation to the
transaction, or to select appropriate non-code law in the absence of
agreement between the parties. The Restatement 60 discusses choice of
law principles for negotiable instruments,361 which are applicable if
neither the Code nor the parties' agreement designates appropriate law.
If the instrument designates a place of payment the local law of that
jurisdiction governs obligations of the maker of a note or the acceptor
of a draft.3 62 If the instrument does not designate a place of payment
the local law where the maker or acceptor delivered the instrument will
control his obligations. 63
The drafters of the Restatement noted the importance of predict-
ability in negotiable instruments and, therefore, proposed that a single
set of contacts govern choice of law for obligations of makers and ac-
ceptors.3 64 They recognized that fairness required keeping the obliga-
tions of makers and acceptors constant throughout the life of the in-
strument, and suggested that initial delivery or designation of place of
payment fix the parties' obligations. 6 5 Therefore, the local law of the
place where a drawer or indorser delivers the instrument controls the
obligations of an indoreser of a draft or a note and of the drawer of a
draft.366 The drafters noted the different responsibilities of drawers, in-
dorsers, makers, and acceptors, and concluded that a different set of
laws may govern the obligations of each party to the instrument.361
Therefore, the local law of the jurisdiction where presentment, pay-
ment, protest, or notice of dishonor occur governs details of each of
those transactions.3 68 Local law of the state where a negotiable instru-
ment is when a holder transfers his interest determines effect of the
transfer.369
In Exchange Bank and Trust Co. v. Tamerius,170 the Supreme
360. In this discussion "Restatement" refers to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1971). Compare references to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
(1958) earlier in this article.
361. RESTATEMENT §§ 214-217.
362. Id. § 214(1).
363. Id. § 214(2).
364. Id. comment b at 702.
365. Id.
366. Id. § 215(1).
367. Id. comment b at 707.
368. Id. § 217.
369. Id. § 216.
370. 200 Neb. 807, 265 N.W.2d 847 (1978). Plaintiff sued on a delinquent
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Court of Nebraska reached the result suggested by the Restatement's
analysis.37 1 The unanimous court affirmed the lower court's decision
that Texas law was applicable because the promissory note provided
explicitly that the Texas Consumer Credit Code governed the transac-
tion.372 The court then noted alternatively that Texas law would govern
even if the parties did not choose Texas law . 73 The opinion cited pre-
U.C.C. cases for the proposition that the law of the place of payment
governs a promissory note unless the parties clearly prefer application
of law of the place where the note was made.7
The Georgia Court of Appeals considered relationships among fed-
eral, Georgia, and Virginia law in Fitzgerald v. United Virginia Bank
of Roanoke.Y15 The appellants signed the notes in Georgia and mailed
them to the appellee. 76 The notes were payable in Virginia. 77 The
United States Code permits national banks to charge the highest inter-
est rate that state banks may charge on similar loans.3 78 The court
found that Virginia law governed the interest rate because the notes
were to be paid in Virginia.3 79 The court held that the place of per-
formance prevails over the place where the instrument is executed."
promissory note bearing an interest rate of 12.83%. Defendants argued that the loan
was usurious and void under the laws of Nebraska. Plaintiffs contended that Texas law
governed the note and that the interest charged was valid under the applicable statute.
Id.
371. See RESTATEMENT § 214.
372. Tamerius, 200 Neb. at 810, 265 N.W.2d at 849.
373. Id. at 810, 265 N.W.2d at 850.
374. Id. at 810, 265 N.W.2d at 850, citing United Bank & Trust Co. v. McCul-
lough, 115 Neb. 327, 212 N.W. 762 (1927); Farm Mortgate & Loan Co. v. Beale, 113
Neb. 293, 202 N.W. 877 (1925).
375. 139 Ga. App. 664, 229 S.E.2d (1976). Appellee, a national bank doing bus-
iness in Virginia, sued appellant on two delinquent promissory notes. Appellants argued
that the notes prescribed a usurious rate of interest under Georgia law so they should
only be liable for outstanding principal. Id. at 664-65, 229 S.E.2d at 139.
376. Id. at 665, 229 S.E.2d at 139.
377. Id.
378. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. 1981).
379. Fitzgerald, 139 Ga. App. at 666, 229 S.E.2d at 140.
380. Id. (citing Vinson v. Platt & McKenzie, 21 Ga. 135 (1856)); Liberty Loan
Corp. v. Crowder, 116 Ga. App. 280, 157 S.E.2d 52 (1967). Cf. Gulf Collateral, Inc. v.
Morgan, 415 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (in which the court cited the RESTATEMENT
§ 214(2) to support the proposition that the local law of the place where promissory
notes are executed governs their validity rather than the law of the state where they are
payable. This section is only applicable if the parties did not designate the place of
payment on the instrument).
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The United States Constitution requires each state to give full
faith and credit "to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings
of every other state." '' In 1948 Congress enacted legislation imple-
menting the following provision:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof...
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by
law or usage in the courts of each State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken. 82
These provisions balance policies favoring res judicata and uni-
formity of decisions with policies supporting federalism. The practi-
tioner should consider the ramifications of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause before selecting a forum for litigation. The Missouri Court of
Appeals summarized the effects of the full faith and credit clause in
Jennings v. Klemme 83 The court noted that the only defenses that
may prevent entry of judgment under the full faith and credit clause
are that the original court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, that
the defendant did not have reasonable notice or opportunity to be heard
in the original suit, or that the judgment resulted from fraud."84 The
opinion then noted that the Full Faith and Credit Clause precludes
381. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. The Full Faith and Credit Clause only applies to
"Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings" of sister states; it does not apply to interna-
tional situations. See generally RESTATEMENT § 2, comment b.
382. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (Supp. 1981).
383. 620 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. 1981). In 1967 defendants executed a promis-
sory note to plaintiffs. The note contained a warrant of attorney to confess judgment if
defendant became delinquent in payments. The note did not mention a corporation, but
defendants sibned the note, "Lem Klemme, Pres.," and "Yvonne Klemme, Sec.-Treas."
The Illinois circuit court entered judgment by confession when defendants did not pay
the note. Illinois law only permits garnishment of salary if defendant has been served
with notice and given opportunity to appear. Plaintiff, therefore, served each defendant
with a summons stating that if he failed to appear, "A judgment by confession for
$39,893.68 entered against you on December 7, 1970, may be confirmed." Defendants
ignored the summonses and the Illinois court confirmed judgment. Plaintiffs then filed
a petition in Missouri court for registration of the Illinois judgment pursuant to the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law. Defendants then sought to raise the
defense in U.C.C. § 3-403(2) by parol evidence that they signed on behalf of a partly
disclosed principal. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding for
plaintiffs. Id. at 404-07.
384. Id. at 406 (citing W.B.M. v. G.G.M., 579 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979)).
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consideration of the underlying cause of action, of the analysis of the
foreign judgment or of the law supporting the foreign court's
decision.385
B. England
English rules for choice of law are different from provisions of the
Restatement. The Bills of Exchange Act treats each contract on the
instrument separately, and applies the law of the jurisdiction where
that contract was entered to determine its validity and interpretation. 38
Section 72 states choice of law rules applicable to bills of exchange;
section 89 applies these rules to promissory notes.
The Bills of Exchange Act distinguishes between inland or foreign
bills of exchange. 87 Courts treat a bill of exchange as an inland bill
unless the face of the instrument shows it is foreign.388 The law of the
jurisdiction where a person draws, indorses, or accepts an instrument or
accepts a bill over protest generally governs interpretation of his rights
and obligations. 389 If a person indorses an inland bill in a foreign coun-
try, however, the courts will apply United Kingdom law to interpret the
indorsement's effect on rights and obligations of the payor.390
For choice of law purposes a party enters a contract on a bill of
exchange or a promissory note where he delivers the instrument rather
than where he attaches his signature. 391 If the defendant argues that an
instrument is invalid according to the law of the jurisdiction where it is
issued, he must prove the foreign law as a question of fact.392 The
Court of Appeals has found that law governing transfer of personal
property also controls negotiation of bills of exchange and checks in a
foreign country.393
385. Id. at 406 (citing Matter of Estate of Fields 588 S.W. 2d 50, 52 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979)).
386. See Bills of Exchange Act §§ 72(1), 72(2).
387. Bills of Exchange Act § 4(1) defines inland and foreign bills: "An inland
bill is a bill which is or on the face of it purports to be (a) both drawn and payable
within the British Islands, or (b) drawn within the British Islands upon some person
resident therein. Any other bill is a foreign bill." Id.
388. Id. § 4(2).
389. Id. § 72(2).
390. Id.
391. CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 147, at 235.
392. Id.
393. Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, [1905] 1 K.B. 677, 683 (C.A.).
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The law of the place where an instrument was issued determines
formal validity. 394 The law of the place where a person accepts, pro-
tests, or indorses a negotiable instrument determines formal validity of
his contract.39 5 The statute states two provisos. First, a negotiable in-
strument issued outside the United Kingdom will not be invalid merely
because it was not stamped according to the law of the jurisdiction
where it was issued. Second, if a negotiable instrument satisfies re-
quirements for formal validity in the United Kingdom but is issued
abroad, courts may treat it as valid between all people who negotiate,
hold, or become parties to it in the United Kingdom.396
The following illustrations reflect choice of law principles for for-
mal validity: 9 7 (1) Law of country A requires a bill of exchange to
state the value received but law of B does not. A bill of exchange that
does not express the value received is valid if it was drawn in B but
payable in A;398 (2) A bill of exchange drawn and payable in A is
invalid according to A's law because it fails to state the value received.
If the bill is indorsed in B, where the bill is valid, a holder could sue
the indorser in B's court but would have no recourse against the
drawer; 99 (3) B's law will determine whether a bill of exchange drawn
in B against a drawee in A is unconditional. 00
The following situations illustrate the effect of section 72(2),
which provides rules for interpretation of instruments that are v.alid
under section 72(1): (1) If a negotiable instrument payable to bearer is
issued in England and negotiated by delivery in a country that does not
recognize bearer instruments, English courts will uphold validity of the
transfer;401 (2) If a holder sues in England on an instrument issued in
Belgium and indorsed in blank in France, French law will determine
the effect of the indorsement; °2 (3) French law governs an acceptance
occurring in France;403 (4) A check drawn abroad on an English bank
394. Bills of Exchange Act § 72(1).
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See id.
398. CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 147, at 235. Cf. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 214-217 (providing that place of performance
generally governs).
399. CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 147, at 235.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 236; Bills of Exchange Act § 72(2) paragraph 2.
402. CHALMERS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 147, at 236.
403. Id.
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is stolen and the first indorsement is forged. An Austrian bank cashes
the check and acquires good title under Austrian law. The Austrian
bank sends the check to the drawee through the normal collection pro-
cess and receives the face value from the drawee. The drawee is not
guilty of conversion for improper payment.4 °4
The Cheques Act codified the result in illustration (4) by provid-
ing that a banker is not liable for paying an irregularly indorsed check
if he pays in good faith and in the ordinary course of business.4 " The
Embiricos decision on which this hypothetical situation is based406
found choice of law rules determinative, and created broader protection
for bankers than that codified in the Cheques Act.
C. Civil Law Practice and the Geneva Conventions
1. Overview
Delegates to the Geneva Conference which was held from May 13,
1930, to June 7, 1930, signed a convention to regulate choice of law
problems for bills of exchange crossing national boundaries.4 °7 On
March 19, 1931, delegates to a second conference signed a convention
regulating conflicts of law problems for checks.40 8 The Conventions
were registered with the secretariat and were entered into force on Jan-
uary 1, 1934.409 The Conventions provide that the law of the state of a
person's nationality governs his capacity to bind himself on a negotiable
404. Id. (citing Embiricos, I K.B. 677).
405. Cheques Act § 1, supra note 97.
406. See supra note 404.
407. Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection
with Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, June 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 319 [herein-
after cited as Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention].
408. Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection
with Cheques, March 19, 1931, 143 L.N.T.S. 409 [hereinafter cited as Cheques Con-
flicts Convention]. The following states ratified or acceded to the Convention: Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, German Democratic Republic,
declaring reapplication of the Convention as of June 6, 1958, Hungary, Indonesia, It-
aly, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Sweden and Switzerland. UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF
WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITORY FUNCTIONS 580 (1978),
U.N.Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/11 (1978).
409. Cheques Conflicts Convention, 143 L.N.T.S. at 319.
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instrument.410 If choice of law rules in his country provide for applica-
tion of another's law, that nation's local law will determine capacity.4"'
The law of the jurisdiction where a person enters a contract arising
from a negotiable instrument controls that contract's form.41 2 The law
of the jurisdiction where a bill of exchange or promissory note is paya-
ble controls the obligations of the acceptor of the bill or maker of the
note.413 The law of the country in which any other person signs the
instrument governs the effect of his signature.
4 14
The Convention's emphasis on place of signature, domicile, and
jurisdiction where the instrument is payable has the advantage of bas-
ing a person's liability on the law with which he is generally is most
familiar and which he generally expects to apply. Emphasis on a single
criterion such as place of signature or payment increases predictability
of effects of commercial instruments by facilitating determination of
appropriate law. The Genva Conventions on Conflicts of Laws do not
include any provisions permitting contractual selection of law or forum;
the drafters emphasized uniformity of selection of law at the expense of
party autonomy.
2. France
France did not adopt the Geneva Conventioins on Conflicts into its
legal codes. Commentators deplore the lack of codification and the re-
sulting need to follow archaic law.415 Conflicts of law principles appli-
cable to negotiable instruments remains unclear. Unlike the Geneva
Conventions on Conflicts of Law, France permits parties to exercise
substantial discretion in choice of law. The Cours de Cassation has rec-
ognized that the law applicable for formation, conditions, or effects of
410. Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 325; Che-
ques Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 415.
411. Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 325; Che-
ques Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 415.
412. Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 325; Che-
ques Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 415. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-105 (providing
that the forum's version of the Code will govern the form); Bills of Exchange Act § 72
(providing that the place of delivery after execution determines applicable law).
413. Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 325.
414. Id.; Cheques Conflicts Convention art. 2, 143 L.N.T.S. at 415.
415. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPtDIE DALLOZ, Droit international- Conflicts de lois §
82 (1968).
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contracts is the law that the parties expressly adopt.416 In the absence
of a stipulation by the parties, the court considers circumstances of
each case to determine which law should govern the contract.417 The
court also presumes that the parties intend the law of the place of per-
formance to control their obligations. 418 A French principal and a man-
dataire or contractual agent are generally free to choose any nation's
law to control their contract.419 Claims to compensation by a V.R.P.420
are subject to French law when the agent lives and performs the con-
tract in France, and parties may not avoid mandatory provisions of the
labor code by a choice of law provision in the contract.42'
The Cours de Cassation developed special choice of law principles
applicable to negotiable instruments. If a party contests his obligations
under a bill of exchange drawn outside France and payable within
France, a French court generally will apply the law of the jurisdiction
where the drawees are domiciled.422 If the instrument is domiciled the
court will apply law of the jurisdiction where it is payable, or where
plaintiff signed a protest.423
D. Summation
The practitioner should advise an agent executing negotiable in-
struments that he expects to cross national or state boundaries to in-
clude an explicit choice of law clause. United States courts generally
will uphold the provision if the parties select the laws of a jurisdiction
with a reasonable relation to the transaction. What constitutes a rea-
sonable relation remains unclear, but the domicile of one of the parties
or the place of performance of some part of the transaction should have
sufficient connection to satisfy U.C.C. section 1-105(1). Unlike the
Uniform Commercial Code, the English Bills of Exchange Act empha-
sizes uniformity at the expense of party autonomy. A practitioner
whose client does business with the United Kingdom should review
416. Ste. des Fourrures Renel v. Allouche, reprinted in 48 REVUE CRITIQUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 708 (1959), citing C. civ. art. 1134.
417. Id.
418. 3 JURISPRUDENCE FRANIAISE, Conflit de lois § 419 (1967).
419. E. Hay & Muller-Freienfels, supra note 280, at 14.
420. See supra text accompanying note 280.
421. Hay & MuIler-Freienfels, supra note 280, at 14.
422. 3 JURISPRUDENCE FRANCAISE, Conflit de lois § 476 (1967), citing REVUE
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 116 (1939).
423. Id.
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choice of law rules in section 72 of the Bills of Exchange Act. The
Geneva Conventions on Conflicts of Law differ substantially from the
United States approach as they base choice of law largely on the place
where a party signs the instrument or where the instrument is payable.
Although France acceded to the Convention, it did not adopt it into its
Commercial or Civil Codes. French law remains poorly defined and al-
lows parties to a negotiable instrument substantial direction in selecting
applicable law.
VI. Proposals for Reform
A. Hague Convention on Agency
When the General Meeting of the Thirteenth Hague Session was
unable to complete work on a convention on agency, a special commis-
sion of the Thirteenth Session of The Hague Conference on Private
International Law convened on June 6, 1977, to draft a final agree-
ment.424 France was the only country to sign the Convention when it
was opened for signature in March, 1978,425 and France has not
adopted its provisions. The Hague Convention adopts a flexible ap-
proach to choice of law in international agency relations and it may
form the basis for future developments in the area.
The Hague Convention deals solely with choice of law questions; it
contains no provisions prescribing standards for local law. Article 5 al-
lows complete party autonomy by permitting principal and agent to se-
lect applicable law. 426 Article 6427 indicates applicable law when the
parties do not record any preference in their contract. In the absence of
agreement by the parties, the courts of law of the nation where the
agent has his place of business should apply the local law where the
agent has his habitual residence.42s The local law of the place of per-
formance applies if it is also the principal's place of business or the
424. Hague Conference on Private International Law, 3 Actes et Documents de
la Treizieme Session 42 (1978), 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 438 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Hague Convention]. See Comment, The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Agency, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 434 (1978).
425. Hay & Muller-Freienfels, supra note 280, at 36 n. 184.
426. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (permitting express or implied selection of the law of
any jurisdiction with a reasonable relation to the transaction).
427. Hague Convention art. 6.
428. Id.
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principal's habitual residence, if he does not have a place of business.429
The law found applicable under the Convention determines the exis-
tence and scope of an agent's authority.4 30 Additionally, the applicable
law also governs relations between an agent and a third party when the
agent exceeds or misuses his authority.4"' The Convention combines el-
ements from several legal systems as it balances policies favoring party
autonomy with a need for uniform and predictable decisions.43 2 The
drafters placed special importance on the parties' choice of applicable
law. Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code, the Hague Convention
does not limit the right to choose law.4"3 Although they may be ex-
pected to select law with which they are most familiar, complete party
autonomy allows the principal or agent to make frivolous or unfair se-
lections that may burden courts with a need to research and apply rules
from a distant jurisdiction.
The Hague Convention furthers policies for uniformity and pre-
dictability by stating objective criteria for choice of law in the absence
of a stipulation by the parties. In the absence of agreement between
parties as to choice of law, the Convention applies law of the state in
which the agent does business:43 4
because it is the law indicated by the connecting factor most
closely connected with the party who performs the obligation char-
acteristic of the agreement; secondly, because the agent's principal
place of business is more likely to coincide with the place where he
acts than is the principal's principal place of business; and thirdly,
because this solution seems to do justice to the pivotal role of the
agent, at the center of the complex of relationships arising in an
agency situation. As a connecting factor, the agent's principal place
of business has the advantage of being clear and readily
ascertainable. 435
The Convention is particularly significant because it reflects a con-
429. Id.
430. Id. art. 8(a).
431. Id. art. 15.
432. See generally Hay & Muller-Freienfels, supra note 280.
433. Cf. § 1-105(1) (requiring selection of the law of a jurisdiction that bears a
reasonable relation to the transaction).
434. Hague Convention art. 6.
435. Karsten, Report on the Preliminary Draft Convention, Prel. Doe. No. 5 at
14, Hague Conference on Private International Law, 1 Actes et Documents de la
Treizieme Session (1976), reprinted in 27 AM. J. COMP. L. at 41.
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cerned effort to unify choice of law rules and because the drafters were
able to further competing policy concerns by borrowing from several
legal systems.
B. UNCITRAL Proposal
The United National Commission on International Trade Law at
its second session in Geneva in March, 1969, discussed methods for
unifying law governing negotiable instruments in international com-
merce.4 36 The Commission noted that three competing legal regimes
controlled bills of exchange and promissory notes transactions among
western nations. The delegates concluded that the most effective way to
achieve uniformity would be by creation of a new instrument to be used
in international commerce and subject to a new uniform law.4 37 The
final draft of UNCITRAL's Uniform Law on International Bills of Ex-
change and Promissory Notes (ULIB)4 38 allows private parties to
choose whether the UNCITRAL proposal or traditional law should
govern each instrument.4 39 Although eighteen nations participated in
the UNCITRAL draft,440 the Convention has not been adopted into
law.
Parties to a negotiable instrument may choose to have the ULIB
govern only if the instrument satisfies requirements of article 1. The
instrument must be written and must state in the text "pay against this
international bill of exchange, governed by [the Convention of -]."441
436. Blomquist, The Proposed Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange
and Promissory Notes: A Discussion of Some Special and General Problems Reflected
in the Form and Content, Choice of Law, and Judicial Interpretation Articles, 9 CAL.
W. INT'L. L. J. 30 (1979).
437. Id. at 32.
438. International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, Draft
Report of the Working Group on International Negotiable Instruments on the Work of
its Fifth Session (July 18-29, 1977), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/CRP.11 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as ULIB].
439. Id. at 35.
440. Members of the working group include France, India, Mexico, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and United States of America. Observers
included Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Liberia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey. Organizations represented
on the Commission included International Monetary Fund, European Banking Federa-
tion, European Economic Community, and the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG. IV/INF. 2, July 27, 1977.
441. ULIB art. 1(2). Cf. Bills of Exchange Convention art. 1, C. COM. art. 110
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It must include an unconditional order to pay a definite sum of money
to a specified person or to his order, be payable on demand or at a
definite time, and be signed by the drawer and dated.442 An interna-
tional bill of exchange subject to the ULIB must show that at least two
of the following places are in different countries: the place of payment,
the place indicated next to the name of the drawee, and the place writ-
ten beside the name of the payee.443 The ULIB has similar require-
ments for a promissory note, but the text must include the provision
"against this international promissory note, governed by [the Conven-
tion of _]", and must show that at least two of the following are in
different countries; the place where the instrument was made, the place
identified next to the signature of the maker or the name of the payee,
or the place of payment.444
The ULIB paraphrases Uniform Commercial Code provisions dis-
cussing an agent's liability on negotiable instruments but rejects admis-
sion of parol evidence if it is unclear whether the agent signed in a
representative capacity. 445 A person can only be liable on an instrument
(requiring statement "bills of exchange" written on the instrument).
442. ULIB art. 1.
443. Id.
444. Id. art. I, § 3.
445.
(1) An instrument may be signed by an agent.
(2)The signature on an instrument by an agent with authority to sign and
showing on the instrument that he is signing in a representative capacity
for a named person imposes liability thereon on that person and not on
the agent.
(3)The signature on an instrument by an agent without authority to sign,
or by an agent with authority to sign but not showing on the instrument
that he is signing in a representative capacity for a named person, or
showing on the instrument that he is signing in a representative capacity
but not naming the person whom he represents, imposes liability thereon
on such agent and not on the person whom the agent purports to
represent.
(4)The question whether a signature was placed on the instrument in a
representative capacity may be determined only with reference to what
appears on the face of the instrument.
(5)An agent who is liable pursuant to paragraph 3 and who pays the in-
strument has the same rights as the person for whom he purported to
act would have had if that person had paid the instrument.
ULIB art. 30. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 3-403 and 3-404(1), which provide rules for agents' per-
sonal liability. Compare art. 30(5) with § 3-415(5), concerning the doctrine of
subrogation.
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under the ULIB if he signs it or if an agent signs it on his behalf.446 A
signature may be by fascimile, symbols, or by any mechanical
means.447 Furthermore, a person signing another's name without au-
thority is deemed to have signed his own.448 An agent who signs on his
principal's behalf, but without authority, is treated as a forger and is
liable for any damages his signature causes.449
The ULIB follows United States practice by recognizing separate
classes of holder and protected holder.450 A protected holder takes the
instrument free from any claims by any person,451 free from all de-
fenses but incapacity4 2 or the signer's excusable ignorance that his sig-
nature made him a party to a negotiable instrument, 453 and free from
any claim that the instrument was not presented for acceptance or pay-
ment, or that dishonor was not protested.4 4 A drawer, maker, or in-
dorser may protect himself from a protected holder by writing a state-
ment on the instrument such as "not negotiable," "not transferable,"
"not to order," or "pay X only. " 4 5 The transferee of an instrument
bearing these words will become a holder only for the limited purposes
of collection.456
If the ULIB is adopted, it will provide practitioners greater flex-
ibility in advising their clients. The third draft is patterned closely after
the Uniform Commercial Code, and a practitioner should provide simi-
lar advice to an agent as to form of signature and necessary authority
446. ULIB art. 22.
447. Id. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(39), which defines "signature" as "any symbol exe-
cuted or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." Id.
448. ULIB art. 22. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-404(1) (providing that an unauthorized signa-
ture obligates the signer on the instrument).
449. ULIB art. 22.
450. ULIB art. 5, §§ 6-7. A protected holder has rights similar to those of a
holder in due course under U.C.C. § 3-305. See ULIB art. 25(1). Compare practice
under the Geneva Convention in which there is only one class of holder.
451. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-305(1) (granting the same right to a holder in due course).
452. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(a) (providing the defense of infancy to the extent
that local law provides defendant did not have capacity to obligate himself, and § 3-
305(2)(b), granting a defense of incapacity to the extent that defendant's act was void
rather than voidable).
453. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(c) (providing a defense for "fraud in the factum" or
"real fraud" for misrepresentation that prevented the signer from learning the nature
or essential terms of the instrument he signed).
454. These rights of a protected holder are governed by ULIB art. 25.
455. See ULIB art. 16.
456. Id.
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in order to prevent his client's unintended personal liability on the in-
strument. Drafters of the ULIB intend its provisions to be optional.
Lawyers should evaluate their clients' right if the ULIB is applied and
also if the client acts under the law of another jurisdiction. The ULIB
furthers both party autonomy and uniformity of law because applica-
tion of the ULIB would be subject to the parties' agreement, and its
application would supply substantive law rather than rules for choice of
law.
VII. Conclusion
Negotiable instruments receive similar treatment under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, the English Bills of Exchange Act, and the
Geneva Conventions. Differences remain, however, and choice of law
principles become increasingly important as the size and frequency of
international transactions increase. An agent signing a negotiable in-
strument in his representative capacity may always escape personal lia-
bility on the instrument if he has authority to sign and he signs in the
proper form.
In the United States, a person who signs an instrument in an-
other's behalf is personally liable on the instrument, if he did not have
authority to obligate the person he claimed to represent. A signer may
escape personal liability if he establishes that he had actual or apparent
authority, or any other source of power to obligate the principal. The
authorized agent should indicate on the instrument that he signs in a
representative capacity, and should identify the person in whose behalf
he signs.
The English Bills of Exchange Act influenced development of the
U.C.C., and negotiable instruments in England have substantially the
same effect as in the United States. An agent generally will not be
liable on the instrument if he indicates his representative capacity and
identifies his principal, even if he exceeds his authority.
The Geneva Conventions are the basis for negotiable instruments
law in several nations in western Europe. France adopted these Con-
ventions and French treatment of negotiable instruments follows their
provisions. The Code de Commerce provides more stringent formal re-
quirements for negotiability than the Bills of Exchange Act or the
U.C.C. France requires the maker or drawer to indicate in the text of
the instrument the kind of instrument he is executing and to state the
name of the payor. An agent may obligate his principal and escape
personal liability on the instrument only if he has authority to bind the
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principal and he clearly acknowledges the representative capacity of his
signature. The Code Civil suggests that representative authority is
strictly construed in France. The Cours de Cassation, however, recog-
nizes a source of authority similar to apparent authority or inherent
agency power in United States practice.
The U.C.C. allows parties to an instrument to select the law gov-
erning the instrument provided that they choose the law of a state
which has 'a reasonable relation to the transaction. If they do not
choose applicable law the forum will apply its own version of the
U.C.C., provided that the forum has an appropriate relation to the
transaction. If the parties do not choose applicable law and the forum
must look beyond its version of the U.C.C. to resolve the dispute, the
court will apply general choice of law rules from outside the U.C.C.
The English Bills of Exchange Act treats each contract on the in-
strument separately, and applies the law of the jurisdiction where that
contract was entered into, in order to determine its validity and inter-
pretation. The Bills of Exchange Act furthers predictability at the ex-
pense of party autonomy. Courts will choose applicable law on the basis
of objective and uniform criteria rather than on the parties' choice of
law.
The Geneva Conventions on negotiable instruments include con-
ventions on conflicts of law. These conventions emphasize objective cri-
teria in choice of law, such as place of signature, domicile, and jurisdic-
tion where the instrument is payable. The Geneva Conventions do not
contain any provisions permitting contractual selection of law or forum.
The drafters of the Conventions emphasized uniformity of selection of
law at the expense of party autonomy.
Although France acceded to the Geneva Conventions it did not
adopt their provisions on conflicts of laws. France permits parties to
exercise substantial discretion in choosing applicable law. If the parties
have not selected governing law, courts generally will apply the law
with which the parties are most familiar.
Perhaps the most intriguing proposal for reform is UNCITRAL's
final draft of a Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange and
Promissory Notes. If this draft is adopted, parties to an international
transaction may select a comprehensive body of rules that borrows
from each of the major systems of negotiable instruments. Adoption of
this proposal would further potentially conflicting policies favoring
party autonomy and uniform application of law. Parties to an interna-
tional transaction could choose to be subject to the ULIB, and the
ULIB then would provide the rules governing their rights and obliga-
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tions. The transnational practitioner should consult each regime of law
as he determines when an agent will be personally liable on a negotia-
ble instrument which the agent signed on his principal's behalf.
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